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Lost Life and Life Projects† 
SEAN HANNON WILLIAMS* 
This Article provides the first analysis of wrongful death damages from the 
perspective of individual justice accounts of tort law. There is a widespread belief 
that wrongful death damages are incoherent. Currently, tort law responds only to 
the harms of the decedent’s living relatives. Drawing on deterrence rationales, 
Cass Sunstein, Eric Posner, and others have recommended altering these damage 
awards so that they respond to the harms of the decedent herself by providing “lost 
life” damages. This Article offers a different and powerful new foundation for lost 
life damages rooted in corrective justice and its main competitor, civil recourse. At 
first blush, both corrective justice and civil recourse appear to undercut lost life 
damages. Once properly understood, however, each theory supports a life-projects 
approach to lost life damages. The normative underpinnings of these tort theories 
suggest that tort damages should respect the ends that the victim set for herself and 
should refrain from valuing the victim only as a means. Our current tort practices 
do the reverse. The victim is valued only through the effects she had on others—
only as a means of her family’s flourishing—rather than as an equal person with 
her own life projects. Lost life damages can respect the victim’s ends in several 
ways. One possibility would be awarding money to her estate. The victim’s will or 
other testamentary instrument would then direct that award to further whatever life 
projects she felt were important enough to survive her death. 
 
INTRODUCTION.................................................................................................... 1746 
I. PAST AND PRESENT RESPONSES TO WRONGFUL DEATH .................................. 1749 
A. FATAL ACCIDENTS IN ENGLAND ........................................................... 1749 
B. WRONGFUL DEATH IN THE UNITED STATES .......................................... 1751 
II. AN OVERVIEW OF INDIVIDUAL JUSTICE ACCOUNTS OF TORT LAW ................ 1754 
A. CORRECTIVE JUSTICE ............................................................................ 1754 
B. CIVIL RECOURSE ................................................................................... 1759 
III. DEATH AND LOSSES: ALLOCATIVE ACCOUNTS OF CORRECTIVE JUSTICE ...... 1762 
A. IS DEATH A LOSS TO THE DECEASED? .................................................. 1762 
B. WHAT DOES IT MEAN TO “REPAIR” OR “ANNUL” A LOSS? .................. 1763 
C. POSTHUMOUS BENEFITS ........................................................................ 1764 
D. SUMMARY OF LOST LIFE DAMAGES UNDER ALLOCATIVE CORRECTIVE 
JUSTICE ...................................................................................................... 1766 
IV. DEATH AND WRONGS: RELATIONAL ACCOUNTS OF CORRECTIVE JUSTICE ... 1767 
A. THE CHALLENGE OF CORRELATIVITY ................................................... 1767 
B. THE CHALLENGE OF CONTENT: THE AFFIRMATIVE CASE FOR LOST LIFE 
                                                                                                                 
 
 † Copyright © 2012 Sean Hannon Williams. 
 * Assistant Professor, University of Texas School of Law. For insightful comments, I 
am indebted to Ronen Avraham, Mitchell Berman, Oren Bracha, Curtis Bridgeman, Peter 
Cane, John Deigh, William Forbath, John C.P. Goldberg, Dan Markel, John Robertson, 
Jason Solomon, Richard Wright, I. Glenn Cohen, Justin Driver, Joseph Fishkin, Mira Ganor, 
Andrew Hessick, Carissa Hessick, Samuel Jordan, Jennifer Laurin, Angela Littwin, and 
Kevin Toh. Thanks also to participants at the Southwest Law Faculty Conference at Arizona 
State University. For superlative research assistance, I thank Katherine Piatti.  
1746 INDIANA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 87:1745 
 
DAMAGES .................................................................................................. 1772 
C. SUMMARY OF LOST LIFE DAMAGES UNDER RELATIONAL CORRECTIVE 
JUSTICE ...................................................................................................... 1778 
V. DEATH AND RETALIATION: CIVIL RECOURSE ................................................. 1778 
A. DESCRIPTIVE ACCOUNTS OF CIVIL RECOURSE ...................................... 1778 
B. NORMATIVE DEFENSES OF CIVIL RECOURSE ......................................... 1780 
VI. IMPLICATIONS ............................................................................................... 1786 
A. LOST LIFE DAMAGES: DESIRABILITY .................................................... 1786 
B. LOST LIFE DAMAGES: FEASIBILITY ....................................................... 1786 
C. LOST LIFE DAMAGES: MEASURABILITY ................................................ 1788 
CONCLUSION ....................................................................................................... 1788 
INTRODUCTION 
There is a widespread belief that wrongful death damages are flawed. Consider 
Sally, a single mother of two. She is crushed and then burned to death when her car 
is struck from behind by an eighteen wheeler.1 It would be a great understatement 
to say that Sally is unfortunate. Under current law, her family members can recover 
damages for their losses, but Sally’s loss will never be addressed. Now imagine 
that Sally is multiply unfortunate. Her parents died long ago, she is divorced, and 
her children die alongside her. In many states, no one will have a wrongful death 
claim, and Sally’s loss will never be addressed within tort law. Had Sally merely 
sprained her ankle, the negligent driver would have been liable.2 But by crushing 
and burning both her and her children, the driver would escape tort liability. This 
strikes many as incoherent. 
There has been renewed interest over the last several years as to when wrongful 
death damages are warranted and how they should be measured. This renewed 
interest focuses on the deterrence aim of tort damages and seeks to justify the 
imposition of “lost life” damages—that is, damages designed to respond to the 
losses that the decedent herself suffers from death.3 Similar deterrence arguments 
have circulated in the legal literature for at least twenty years.4 Yet they have thus 
far fallen on deaf ears.5  
                                                                                                                 
 
 1. Sadly, this is not a purely fictional account. Andrew J. McClurg, Dead Sorrow: A 
Story About Loss and a New Theory of Wrongful Death Damages, 85 B.U. L. Rev. 1, 4 
(2005) (describing the death of his fiancée as diesel fuel spilled out of the truck and poured 
over her car). Thankfully, the miseries that I added are purely hypothetical.  
 2. For additional loopholes in wrongful death practices, see Meredith A. Wegener, 
Purposeful Uniformity: Wrongful Death Damages for Unmarried, Childless Adults, 51 S. 
TEX. L. REV. 339, 351 (2009). 
 3. McClurg, supra note 1, at 7 & n.26 (suggesting the term “lost life damages” in lieu 
of “hedonic damages”); see Joni Hersch & W. Kip Viscusi, Saving Lives Through Punitive 
Damages, 83 S. CAL. L. REV. 229, 239–40 (2010); Frank Cross & Charles Silver, In Texas, 
Life Is Cheap, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1875, 1916–19, 1923 (2006); Eric A. Posner & Cass R. 
Sunstein, Dollars and Death, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 537, 544 (2005) (referring to lost life 
damages as “hedonic damages”). 
 4. For an early version of this argument, see Andrew Jay McClurg, It’s a Wonderful 
Life: The Case for Hedonic Damages in Wrongful Death Cases, 66 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 57 
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This Article provides a new and different foundation for awarding lost life 
damages. This justification for lost life damages is rooted in individual justice 
accounts of tort law. No one has ever undertaken the project of assessing whether 
our wrongful death practices cohere with these accounts.6 This inattention is 
unfortunate. Although the three dominant justice-based accounts of tort law—
allocative corrective justice, relational corrective justice, and civil recourse 
theory7—each appear at first glance to demand our current approach to wrongful 
death, at least two of the three in fact strongly support lost life damages. They also 
provide insights into the proper way to measure such damages. These accounts 
justify an approach to wrongful death damages that seeks to further the victim’s life 
projects.8  
Allocative corrective justice accounts focus on welfare setbacks. They impose 
duties on wrongdoers to annul their victim’s losses.9 There is one irreducible 
minimum requirement that must be met before liability can be imposed under 
allocative corrective justice: damages must be able to benefit the victim. Allocative 
corrective justice accommodates lost life damages only if the following two 
conditions are met: death is a harm to the decedent, and events that take place after 
she dies can benefit the decedent. This sounds impossible. Interestingly, many 
philosophers disagree.10 The gist of their argument is that we are better off if we 
satisfy our preferences, that some of our preferences concern states of the world 
that will occur after our death, and that satisfying those preferences posthumously 
                                                                                                                 
(1990). 
 5. As Richard Wright has forcefully argued, there is often a vast gulf between the types 
of arguments that persuade academics and the kinds that persuade courts and legislatures. 
See Richard W. Wright, Justice and Reasonable Care in Negligence Law, 47 AM. J. JURIS. 
143, 145 & n.6 (2002) (arguing that the Hand formula for negligence is pervasive in 
scholarship, classrooms, and the Restatement, yet it is only even “mentioned by a small 
minority of courts, [and] is almost never used by the courts to decide whether particular 
conduct was negligent”). 
 6. Although a few other scholars have commented in passing about corrective justice 
and wrongful death, they have disagreed about what practices would be consistent with 
corrective justice. Compare Gary T. Schwartz, Mixed Theories of Tort Law: Affirming Both 
Deterrence and Corrective Justice, 75 TEX. L. REV. 1801, 1823–24 (1997) (“But when the 
loss is the value of life to the victim himself, there simply is no way in which the defendant 
can . . . compensate or correct for the tortious harm. . . . Corrective justice . . . explains the 
limitation on damages in wrongful death actions, a limitation that seems unsound from a 
deterrence perspective.”), with Glen O. Robinson & Kenneth S. Abraham, Collective Justice 
in Tort Law, 78 VA. L. REV. 1481, 1512 & nn.89–90 (1992) (implying that corrective justice 
requires lost life damages in coma and wrongful death cases), and McClurg, supra note 1, at 
41 (arguing that lost life damages would reflect “corrective justice by giving official 
recognition to the universal belief that life has value”). 
 7. See Curtis Bridgeman, Reconciling Strict Liability with Corrective Justice in 
Contract Law, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 3013, 3020 (2007) (discussing two forms of corrective 
justice: allocative and relational); Theories of Tort Law, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL., 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/tort-theories/#TheTorLawJusRigDut (discussing corrective 
justice and civil recourse) (last rev. Aug. 26. 2010).  
 8. A life project is a stable identity-conferring goal to bring about some objective state 
of the world. See Part IV.B for further discussion of life projects. 
 9. Bridgeman, supra note 7, at 3021 & n.35. 
 10. STEVEN LUPER, THE PHILOSOPHY OF DEATH 135 (2009). 
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can benefit the victim. This is not totally inconsistent with common pretheoretic 
intuitions. For example, a victim’s daughter might feel obligated to carry on the 
business that her father founded. Nonetheless, the uncertainty surrounding the 
possibility of posthumous benefits undermines the ability of allocative corrective 
justice to provide a solid rationale for lost life damages.  
In contrast to allocative corrective justice, relational accounts of corrective 
justice conceive of remedies as “undoing the wrong”11 rather than annulling the 
victim’s loss. In order to undo a wrong, a tort remedy must be “correlatively 
structured.”12 Although some interpretations of this concept of correlativity require 
a living plaintiff who can receive a tort award, the best interpretation of it requires 
much less. Properly understood, relational corrective justice does not preclude lost 
life damages. In fact, it provides a justification for such damages that does not 
require making any claims about posthumous benefits. Part of the tragedy of death 
stems from the way it cuts off our ability to affect the world. This is a tremendous 
loss because everyone has goals and aims that require affecting the world. These 
are her life projects. Extending the victim’s ability to influence the world after her 
death is a fitting response to negligently cutting off these abilities. The simplest 
way to do this is to locate those legal tools that can still convert the victim’s means 
into her ends—namely, wills and other testamentary instruments. These are the last 
vessels of her autonomy. Providing extra money to Sally’s estate makes her 
testamentary choices more potent and enhances the power of her one final chance 
to purposefully influence the world. Furthering this last flicker of choice is a fitting 
response to extinguishing the rest of it. 
Civil recourse theory has emerged over the last fifteen years as a powerful 
challenger to both accounts of corrective justice.13 This theory argues that the 
organizing principle of tort law is the concept of redress. Tort law provides victims 
with a power to seek redress for their injuries. This power of redress is related to 
concepts of retaliation, vengeance, and “acting against” a wrongdoer.14 
Because the concept of redress is related to vengeance and retaliation, and these 
are potentially unsavory foundations on which to build tort law, normative defenses 
of civil recourse seek to cleanse vengeance of its bad connotations in part by 
highlighting the systemic benefits of acting against wrongdoers. For example, the 
process of publically acting against a wrongdoer serves to instantiate a moral order 
rooted in equal respect and mutual accountability. But these normative defenses are 
inconsistent with current wrongful death practices. Wrongful death statutes 
currently ignore the wrongs done to decedents who are not survived by the 
appropriate statutory beneficiaries.15 This undermines rather than instantiates a 
moral order rooted in equal respect. Even if there are some surviving beneficiaries 
                                                                                                                 
 
 11. Ernest J. Weinrib, Deterrence and Corrective Justice, 50 UCLA L. REV. 621, 624 
(2002). 
 12. Ernest J. Weinrib, Corrective Justice in a Nutshell, 52 U. TORONTO L.J. 349, 350 
(2002). 
 13. See Part II.B for a fuller discussion of civil recourse theory. 
 14. Jason M. Solomon, Equal Accountability Through Tort Law, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 
1765, 1770–71 (2009). 
 15. STUART SPEISER & JAMES ROOKS, RECOVERY FOR WRONGFUL DEATH §3:1 (4th ed. 
2005). 
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who can sue, the victim is valued only through the effects she had on others—only 
as a means of her family’s flourishing—rather than as an equal person with her 
own life projects. Again, such a system undermines rather than instantiates equal 
respect. The normative defenses of civil recourse theory support a life-projects 
approach to lost life damages. Such damages respect the victim’s right to adopt her 
own ends while affirming the agency of both the victim and the wrongdoer.  
The most immediate implications of this Article concern the justifications for 
lost life damages. After considering the various individual justice accounts of tort 
law, the case for such damages is strong. Although allocative corrective justice 
provides only dubious support for lost life damages, other accounts of tort law 
strongly support them, including relational corrective justice, civil recourse, and 
deterrence.  
This Article will begin in Part I by providing a history of wrongful death law, 
from medieval English practices to current U.S. practices. Part II introduces 
individual justice accounts of tort law. It lays out the basic building blocks of 
corrective justice, differentiates allocative from relational corrective justice, and 
introduces civil recourse theory. Parts III, IV, and V are the heart of the Article. 
Part III argues that allocative corrective justice can, in theory, accommodate lost 
life damages. However, this requires embracing the dubious claim that events in 
this world can affect the dead. Part IV argues that relational corrective justice 
supports lost life damages. This Part describes the concept of a life project in more 
detail and illustrates how furthering the victim’s life projects fits within the 
confines of relational corrective justice. Part V provides further support for the life-
projects view of lost life damages by turning to civil recourse theory. Part VI 
briefly discusses the implications of this view for our wrongful death practices. 
I. PAST AND PRESENT RESPONSES TO WRONGFUL DEATH 
The way in which remedies for wrongful death have been created and evolved is 
arguably among the greatest failures of American law.16 
A. Fatal Accidents in England 
In early English common law, the maxim actio personalis moritur cum 
persona—personal actions die with the person—created a barrier to wrongful death 
suits.17 Lord Coke first announced this doctrine in 1609,18 but the doctrine had its 
roots in trespass cases 200 years earlier.19 The logic of the doctrine stemmed in part 
from the close relationship between criminal and tort law at the time.20 Civil 
                                                                                                                 
 
 16. Id. § 1:1. 
 17. Wex S. Malone, The Genesis of Wrongful Death, 17 STAN. L. REV. 1043, 1044 
(1965). 
 18. 3 W.S. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 576 (3d ed. 1923); see Pinchon’s 
Case, (1609) 77 Eng. Rep. 859 (K.B.) 860. 
 19. See Y.B. 11 Hen. 4, fol. 45b, Hil., pl. 20 (1410); Y.B. 19 Hen. 6, fol. 66b, Pasch., pl. 
10 (1441). 
 20. See 2 FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERIC MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 
BEFORE THE TIME OF EDWARD I 466 (2d ed. 1898) (describing the common precursor to tort 
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actions aimed to exact punishment as a form of personal vengeance; the idea that 
civil damages were compensatory evolved later.21 When the wrongdoer died, he 
was beyond punishment, and hence there was no reason to hear the case.22 When 
the victim died, she no longer had a need for personal vengeance.23 The concept of 
an executor as a personal representative of the deceased had not yet emerged.24 
Rather, the executor was merely a custodian of a set of property.25 Because the 
executor was not a personal representative of the deceased, he could neither be sued 
for the wrongs of the deceased nor sue others based on wrongs done to the 
deceased.26 As Blackstone explained:  
[T]he rule is that actio personalis moritur cum persona; . . . [the 
decedent’s personal right of action] never shall be revived either by or 
against the executors or other representatives. For neither the executors 
of the plaintiff have received, nor those of the defendant have 
committed, in their own personal capacity, any manner of wrong or 
injury.27  
The actio personalis maxim precluded the estate from suing or being sued.28 It 
did not itself prevent relatives of the victim from suing the wrongdoer.29 Under 
medieval Anglo-Saxon law, the kinsmen of someone who was intentionally or 
unintentionally killed could obtain payments from the wrongdoer.30 The law even 
provided a list of specified damage amounts based on the social standing of the 
victim.31 Despite this medieval tradition, the common law precluded suit even by 
                                                                                                                 
and criminal law in English law); Gustavus Hay, Jr., Death as a Civil Cause of Action in 
Massachusetts, 7 HARV. L. REV. 170, 171 (1893) (noting that all killings, both accidental and 
intentional, were criminal in England by the thirteenth century); Malone, supra note 17, at 
1051 (noting the “semicriminal nature of the action for trespass [and] the personal character 
of the plea of ‘not guilty’”).  
 21. 2 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 20, at 522–23. 
 22. See Percy H. Winfield, Death As Affecting Liability in Tort, 29 COLUM. L. REV. 239, 
244–45 (1929) (“[T]he party cannot be punished when he is dead.”). 
 23. Id. at 249 (“And even if [the wrongdoer] survives, and it is the injured party who has 
died, surely it is the king and not the representatives who should take up redress.”). 
 24. Malone, supra note 17, at 1045, 1047. 
 25. Id. at 1047. 
 26. Id. at 1045–46. This maxim was also rooted in the technicalities of the forms of 
action, which could not accommodate the concept of an executor standing in for one of the 
parties. Id. 
 27. 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *302. The executor could, however, sue 
and be sued in contract and based on violations of property rights. Malone, supra note 17, at 
1053. 
 28. Malone, supra note 17, at 1044. 
 29. T.A. Smedley, Wrongful Death—Bases of the Common Law Rules, 13 VAND. L. 
REV. 605, 610–11 (1960). 
 30. GEORGE CRABB, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 35 (1829); 1 FRANCIS STOUGHTON 
SULLIVAN, LECTURES ON THE CONSTITUTION AND LAWS OF ENGLAND 117 (Gilbert Stuart ed., 
1st Am. Ed. 1805). 
 31. FREDERIC W. MAITLAND & FRANCIS C. MONTAGUE, A SKETCH OF ENGLISH LEGAL 
HISTORY 193–99 (James F. Colby ed., 1915).  
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the victim’s relatives.32 The common law recognized that the head of household 
had a property right in the services he derived from his wife and children.33 Thus he 
was allowed to sue for loss of services, but only when the wife or child was 
injured.34 When they died, so too did the head of household’s right to recover, even 
for the loss of their services.35 This rule was probably the outgrowth of the idea that 
when a felony caused the death of a person, the civil action merged with—and was 
superseded by—a criminal action.36 The criminal conviction would normally result 
in the forfeiture of the wrongdoer’s property to the state.37 This left nothing to 
recover in a civil case by the victim’s relatives.38 Although unintentional killings 
were not felonies, courts extended the logic of this merger doctrine reflexively.39 
Hence in 1808, the judge in Baker v. Bolton stated a broad rule: “[i]n a civil court, 
the death of a human being could not be complained of as an injury.”40  
The 1846 Fatal Accidents Act (“Lord Campbell’s Act”) altered the rule from 
Baker and created a remedy for the relatives of the deceased.41 In its most recent 
form, the act allows the beneficiaries to recover their lost financial support.42 It also 
allows those beneficiaries, regardless of their number, to split a fixed £11,800 
payment to help offset the pain of bereavement.43  
B. Wrongful Death in the United States 
In the American colonies, courts entertained civil suits by relatives of those 
wrongfully killed. In 1674, a Massachusetts court affirmed such damages: “In the 
Case of John Foster accidentally dischar[ged] gun[s] at foules on [the] neck thereby 
                                                                                                                 
 
 32. Malone, supra note 17, at 1053. 
 33. Id. at 1052. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. at 1053.  
 36. Id. at 1055–76; Smedley, supra note 29, at 612; see Smith v. Sykes, (1677) 89 Eng. 
Rep. 160 (K.B.); 1 Freeman 224, 224–25; Higgins v. Butcher, (1606) 80 Eng. Rep. 61 
(K.B.). 
 37. Smedley, supra note 29, at 612. 
 38. See id. 
 39. See id. at 605. 
 40. Baker v. Bolton, (1808) 170 Eng. Rep. 1033 (Nisi Prius); 1 Camp. 493. The U.S. 
Supreme Court had the opportunity to examine the historical pedigree of Baker in the 
context of an admiralty case. See Moragne v. States Marine Lines Inc., 398 U.S. 375, 382–89 
(1970). It noted that the only potential basis for the rule was the merger of the tort action into 
the criminal one. Id. at 383. However, this foundation was absent in the United States 
because no state adopted the rule that felony punishment included forfeiture of property. Id. 
at 384. In fact, the Court found that there were no persuasive reasons for states to adopt 
Baker and deviated from their example to create a common law wrongful death action in 
admiralty. Id. at 386, 409.  
 41. 9 & 10 Vict., c. 93, § 2; see SPEISER & ROOKS, supra note 15, § 1:10. 
 42. For a complete discussion of The Fatal Accidents Act of 1976, see NICHOLAS J. 
MCBRIDE & RODERICK BAGSHAW, TORT LAW 631–40 (3d ed. 2008). 
 43. Fatal Accidents Act, 1976, c. 30 (Eng.). For recent amendments to the Act, see The 
Damages for Bereavement (Variation of Sum) (England and Wales) Order, 2007, W.S.I 
2007/3489, available at http://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2007/3489/made/data.pdf. 
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wounding Samuel Flacks son so as he died the Court sentenct him to pay the father 
of the boy tenn pounds and to pay tenn more as a like fine to the Country.”44 Other 
cases also provided damages to relatives of the deceased.45 
After 1808, however, the dictum in Baker v. Bolton made its way into American 
courts and became the dominant rule.46 Like England, U.S. states overturned the 
rule in Baker by statute.47 They did so by adopting two different types of statutes: 
survival statutes and wrongful death statutes.48 Survival statutes authorized the 
estate of the victim to sue in her name for damages that she could have recovered 
had she lived; wrongful death statutes authorized the victim’s family to sue in their 
own names for their own harms.49  
Survival statues usually cover the harms that the decedent suffered before her 
death. They allow the decedent’s estate to pursue those claims that the decedent 
would have possessed had she survived.50 Thus, the estate may recover the costs of 
medical care, pain and suffering, etc.51 If the victim was doubly unlucky and was 
injured by one wrongdoer before being killed by another, the estate can pursue an 
action for the pre-death harm, and the decedent’s relatives can pursue an action for 
the death itself.52  
                                                                                                                 
 
 44. Foster’s Case, 1 Rec’s. Ct. Assistants Mass. Bay 54, 54 (1675). 
 45. See Lillie’s Case, 1 Rec’s. Ct. Assistants Mass. Bay 358, 358–59 (1691) (twenty-
five pounds); Dounton’s Case, 1 Rec’s. Ct. Assistants Mass. Bay 271, 271–72 (1684) (five 
pounds); Dyar’s Case, 1 Rec’s. Ct. Assistants Mass. Bay 188 (1680) (six pounds for the 
death of a Native American); Hunting’s Case, 1 Rec’s. Ct. Assistants Mass. Bay 114 (1677) 
(twenty pounds); Bent’s Case, 1 Rec’s. Ct. Assistants Mass. Bay 86 (1677) (ten pounds); 
Flynt’s Case, 1 Rec’s. Ct. Assistants Mass. Bay 85, 85 (1677) (twenty pounds); Foord’s 
Case, 1 Rec’s. Ct. Assistants Mass. Bay 60 (1675) (awarding five pounds for running over 
child with cart). 
 46. SPEISER & ROOKS, supra note 15, § 1:2 (collecting hundreds of American cases 
citing Baker v. Bolton). 
 47. Id. at app. A. 
 48. The two types of statutes create independent claims. Spence v. Staras, 507 F.2d 554, 
558 (7th Cir. 1974); Barragan v. Superior Court, 470 P.2d 722, 725 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1970). 
 49. Ronen Perry & Yehuda Adar, Wrongful Abortion: A Wrong in Search of a Remedy, 
5 YALE J. HEALTH POL‘Y L. & ETHICS 507, 530 (2005) (noting that “wrongful death statutes 
apply to relational losses whereas survival statutes apply to the personal losses of the 
decedent”). Although there are many subtle variations on this rough dichotomy, SPEISER & 
ROOKS, supra note 15, §§ 1:9, 1:11, 1:15, they are not pertinent to this Article. 
 50. See, e.g., Ingram v. Howard-Needles-Tammen & Bergendoff, 672 P.2d 1083, 1092 
(Kan. 1983) (“[T]he survival action compensates the decedent for the injuries for which he 
could have recovered had he survived, whereas the wrongful death action compensates the 
heirs for such things as loss of support, companionship and comfort.” (emphasis omitted)).  
 51. See, e.g., Clement v. Consol. Rail Corp., 734 F. Supp. 151, 155 (D.N.J. 1989); 
Smallwood v. Bradford, 720 A.2d 586, 594–95 (Md. 1998). Some survival statutes require 
the estate to sue but direct the proceeds to specific beneficiaries. SPEISER & ROOKS, supra 
note 15, § 1:13. 
 52. Some states sensibly allow or require these suits to be consolidated. See, e.g., CAL. 
CIV. PROC. CODE § 377.62 (West 2004); MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-501 (2011); N.Y. EST. 
POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 11-3.3 (McKinney 2008); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 213.1 (West 
2002).  
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Wrongful death statutes vary greatly in the details, but the vast majority give a 
certain class of beneficiaries—normally the spouse and children of the deceased—
the right to collect damages.53 These statutes measure damages by the losses to the 
beneficiaries, rather than the losses to the decedent herself.54 Such losses include, 
for example, the monetary contributions that the decedent would have made to the 
beneficiaries during her lifetime.55  
Lost life damages fit in a conceptual space between the damages given in 
wrongful death and survival actions. They respond to the victim’s losses from the 
death itself, rather than responding to the victim’s pre-death suffering or the post-
death losses of the victim’s relatives.  
Five states award a hedonic form of lost life damages to the estate: 
Connecticut,56 New Mexico,57 New Hampshire,58 Hawaii,59 and Arkansas.60 These 
states conceive of lost life damages as “loss of enjoyment of life.”61 To award such 
damages, the estate presents evidence about the decedent’s interests, hobbies, close 
relationships, etc.62 For example, in 2007, a federal court applying Arkansas law 
                                                                                                                 
 
 53. Every state allows spouses to recover. SPEISER & ROOKS, supra note 15, § 3:2. Most 
states allow children to recover. Id. § 3:3. Many states allow parents to recover. Id. § 3:7. 
Some states do not enumerate beneficiaries but instead reference the laws of intestate 
succession to determine who can recover. Id. § 3:1. 
 54. Id. § 6:3. Several states measure the pecuniary harm to the estate, rather than the 
pecuniary losses of the survivors. Id. §§ 6:2, 6:3. But these measures of pecuniary harm 
approximate one another, id. § 6:3, and the court distributes proceeds directly to a set of 
beneficiaries rather than funneling them through the victim’s will or other testamentary 
instruments. See Jonathan M. Purver, Damages for Wrongful Death of, or Injury to, Child, 
65 AM. JURISPRUDENCE TRIALS 261, 296 (1997) (noting that under loss to estate systems, 
“[t]he award is not an asset of the estate, nor subject to claims against the estate. The 
plaintiff, whether executor, administrator or beneficiary, is merely a conduit, bound to 
distribute the awards as the statute directs”); see, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 09.55.580 (2010); 
Hales v. Thompson, 432 S.E.2d 388, 393 (N.C. Ct. App. 1993). 
 55. For general discussion of categories of damages, see SPEISER & ROOKS, supra note 
15, § 6 and Perry & Adar, supra note 49, at 531–32. 
 56. See Mather v. Griffin Hosp., 540 A.2d 666, 678 (Conn. 1988); Estate of Katsetos v. 
Nolan, 368 A.2d 172, 183–84 (Conn. 1976). 
 57. See Smith v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 214 F.3d 1235, 1244–45 (10th Cir. 2000; Romero 
v. Byers, 872 P.2d 840, 845–46 (N.M. 1994). 
 58. Marcotte v. Timberlane/Hampstead Sch. Dist., 733 A.2d 394, 399, 405 (N.H. 1999). 
 59. Montalvo v. Lapez, 884 P.2d 345, 364 (Haw. 1994). 
 60. Durham v. Marberry, 156 S.W.3d 242, 248–49 (Ark. 2004). 
 61. See, e.g., Fantozzi v. Sandusky Cement Prods. Co., 597 N.E.2d 474, 481 (Ohio 
1992) (stating that loss of enjoyment of life damages “connote[] the deprivation of certain 
pleasurable sensations and enjoyment through impairment or destruction of the capacity to 
engage in activities formerly enjoyed by the injured plaintiff”). 
 62. See, e.g., Estate of Katsetos v. Nolan, 368 A.2d 172, 184 (Conn. 1976) (affirming 
lost life damage and noting that “[t]here was evidence from which the jury could have found 
that the decedent was 41 years of age at the time of her death and had a life expectancy of 
about 32 years. She was happily married and had four children including the child born on 
the day of her death. She was a very happy person and in good health before the delivery of 
her last child. She was a dedicated mother and homemaker and active in many outside 
activities.”). 
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affirmed a $600,000 award for lost life damages based on the death of a one-year-
old child because “Garret’s parents were not only attentive to his needs; they 
provided a protective, supportive and loving home. . . . His family was a source of 
joy and happiness to Garret . . . . Despite his medical problems, he was a happy and 
responsive child.”63 In 2005, a Connecticut court affirmed $575,000 in lost life 
damages for a sixty-seven-year-old man, noting that he “enjoyed . . . dancing, 
hiking, walking, gardening, visiting with friends, reading, traveling, and watching 
movies and television. . . . [He] was well-liked, had a good sense of humor and was 
intelligent.”64 In 1999, the New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed an award of 
approximately $200,000 for the lost life damages of an eight-year-old boy based on 
photographs that “highlighted the decedent’s activities . . . [such as] karate, T-Ball, 
and football” and his electronic diary, which further “highlighted the activities that 
the decedent enjoyed.”65 
II. AN OVERVIEW OF INDIVIDUAL JUSTICE ACCOUNTS OF TORT LAW 
Corrective justice is the dominant noneconomic account of tort law. It has two 
main versions. Allocative accounts of corrective justice conceive of tort law as 
annulling losses. Relational accounts conceive of tort law as undoing wrongs. 
These share many features in common with each other and with the third major 
individual justice account: civil recourse.  
A. Corrective Justice 
Corrective justice originated with Aristotle66 but remained largely dormant in 
tort scholarship until the positive economic analysis of tort law became popular.67 
Jules Coleman, Ernest Weinrib, Richard Epstein, Stephen Perry, and others 
reinvigorated the notion of corrective justice to provide what they thought was a 
better descriptive account of tort law.68 Corrective justice provides a direct 
normative link between the plaintiff and the defendant: their relationship as the 
doer and sufferer of harm link the two parties.69 Positive economic analysis can 
offer an explanation as to why our tort practices proceed on a case-by-case basis 
                                                                                                                 
 
 63. McMullin v. United States, 515 F. Supp. 2d 914, 928 (E.D. Ark. 2007). 
 64. Osiecki v. Bridgeport Health Care Center, Inc., No. CV020080092S, 2005 WL 
1331225, at *7 & n.9 (Conn. Super. Ct. May 12, 2005). 
 65. Marcotte v. Timberlane/Hampstead Sch. Dist., 733 A.2d 394, 406–07 (N.H. 1999). 
 66. See ARISTOTLE, Book V, in NICOMACHEAN ETHICS (Martin Ostwald trans., Prentice 
Hall 1999). 
 67. Ernest J. Weinrib, Corrective Justice, 77 IOWA L. REV. 403, 403–04 (1992) (noting 
that corrective justice is used mostly in arguments against instrumental theories of tort law). 
 68. JULES L. COLEMAN, RISKS AND WRONGS 361–85 (1992); ARTHUR RIPSTEIN, 
EQUALITY, RESPONSIBILITY, AND THE LAW 24–47 (1999); ERNEST J. WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF 
PRIVATE LAW 56–83 (1995); Richard A. Epstein, Nuisance Law: Corrective Justice and Its 
Utilitarian Constraints, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 49 (1979); Stephen R. Perry, The Moral 
Foundations of Tort Law, 77 IOWA L. REV. 449 (1992).  
 69. WEINRIB, supra note 68, at 65. 
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between the plaintiff and the person who she alleges to have caused her losses.70 
However, the explanation provided by corrective justice accounts was arguably 
simpler, less contingent on empirical assumptions that may not hold in individual 
cases, and more reflective of the language that tort law itself uses to describe what 
it does.71 The point of reinvigorating the concept of corrective justice was to 
provide tort practices with a less contingent foundation.  
Corrective justice remains the dominant noneconomic account of tort law 
today.72 Jules Coleman and Ernest Weinrib are the two leading proponents of 
corrective justice.73 Each presented corrective justice as a descriptive account of 
tort law.74 They each sought to provide an explanation of what they considered to 
be the core features of our tort practices.75 These core elements include: the case-
by-case adjudication of claims, the fact that plaintiffs can only sue particular 
defendants, and the fact that plaintiffs argue that the defendant was responsible for 
their injuries rather than, for example, that the defendant was the cheapest cost 
avoider.76 Coleman favors an allocative account of corrective justice that focuses 
on annulling losses.77 Weinrib favors a relational account that focuses on undoing 
wrongs.78 Although each proffers corrective justice as a descriptive account of tort 
law, many scholars have used corrective justice as a normative guide for tort law.79 
This is not surprising given that corrective justice has obvious normative appeal. 
This Article presumes that if an aspect of tort law is consistent with corrective 
justice, it is at least prima facie normatively desirable.  
An account of tort law must have three features to be properly called a 
corrective justice account: agency, correlativity, and rectification.80 Agency, 
                                                                                                                 
 
 70. Mark Geistfeld, Economics, Moral Philosophy, and the Positive Analysis of Tort 
Law, in PHILOSOPHY AND THE LAW OF TORTS 250, 252–57 (Gerald J. Postema ed., 2001). 
 71. See COLEMAN, supra note 68, at 380–81; Jules Coleman, Tort Law and Tort Theory: 
Preliminary Reflections on Method, in PHILOSOPHY AND THE LAW OF TORTS, supra note 70, 
at 183, 184–86; Benjamin C. Zipursky, Civil Recourse, Not Corrective Justice, 91 GEO. L.J. 
695, 707 (2003). 
 72. Theories of Tort Law, supra note 7. 
 73. Gregory C. Keating, Is Tort a Remedial Institution? 17 (USC Center in Law, Econ. 
& Org., Research Paper No. C10-11 and USC Legal Studies, Research Paper No. 10-10, 
2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1633687 (identifying 
Jules Coleman and Ernest Weinrib as “the leading proponents of corrective justice in our 
time”). 
 74. See WEINRIB, supra note 68, at 5–6; Coleman, supra note 71, at 183–84. 
 75. COLEMAN, supra note 68, at 198; WEINRIB, supra note 68, at 9–10  
 76. COLEMAN, supra note 68, at 198; WEINRIB, supra note 68, at 9–10. 
 77. COLEMAN, supra note 68, at 318–24; see John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. 
Zipursky, Torts as Wrongs, 88 TEX. L. REV. 917, 954 (2010) (“Allocative theories put losses 
at the center of tort law.”). 
 78. See WEINRIB, supra note 68, at 130–31, 133. 
 79. See, e.g., Michael Abramowicz, On the Alienability of Legal Claims, 114 YALE L.J. 
697, 712 (2005); Christopher H. Schroeder, Corrective Justice and Liability for Increasing 
Risks, 37 UCLA L. REV. 439, 449–51 (1990). 
 80. Jules L. Coleman, The Practice of Corrective Justice, 37 ARIZ. L. REV. 15, 26 
(1995). Weinrib has endorsed this view, despite the fact that he presents these features 
slightly differently. Ernest J. Weinrib, Correlativity, Personality, and the Emerging 
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correlativity, and rectification represent a rigorous topography of the familiar moral 
practices that permeate tort law. Suppose you were involved in a fender-bender that 
was the other driver’s fault. Why should the other driver pay for your repairs? The 
most natural response is simple: because the accident was his fault. This response 
relies on the agency of the driver and the connection—or correlativity—between 
his acts and your injury; it then uses this connection to ground a duty of repair.  
1. Agency 
The concept of agency need not detain us for long. Corrective justice theories 
only address “messes” that result from human agency.81 Corrective justice is a 
theory of the duties that moral agents have to one another.82 Because hurricanes, 
floods, or other acts of nature are not moral agents they fall outside of the scope of 
corrective justice. Involuntary movements, too, fall outside of the domain of 
corrective justice.83  
2. Correlativity 
The concept of correlativity is not as straightforward as the concept of agency. 
This concept is the central feature of both allocative and relational versions of 
corrective justice.84  
Correlativity expresses the idea that there is a unique normative relationship 
between victims and wrongdoers,85 or between doers and sufferers.86 This 
relationship provides the justification for imposing a duty of repair on the 
wrongdoer.87 Many of our tort practices, both structural and doctrinal, embody this 
feature of corrective justice.88 The existence of a unique normative link between a 
particular plaintiff and a particular defendant explains the central structural feature 
of tort law: the fact that victims sue people who they claim to be responsible for 
their losses, rather than suing anyone they choose or seeking compensation from 
the government.89 This normative link also explains tort doctrines such as 
causation, duty, and foreseeability.90 Each of these doctrines illuminates different 
ways the parties are uniquely linked together by a string of events starting with the 
defendant’s act and ending with the plaintiff’s injury.  
                                                                                                                 
Consensus on Corrective Justice, 2 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 107, 129 (2001) (expressing 
approval of the content of Coleman’s list, and noting that both understand correlativity in the 
same way); id. at 107 (describing corrective justice as consisting of correlativity and 
personality). 
 81. COLEMAN, supra note 68, at 479. 
 82. See id. at 261–63. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Weinrib, supra note 80, at 129. 
 85. These are Coleman’s preferred terms. See COLEMAN, supra note 68, at 370–71. 
 86. These are Weinrib’s preferred terms. See WEINRIB, supra note 68, at 65. 
 87. COLEMAN, supra note 68, at 367–69; WEINRIB, supra note 68, at 142–43. 
 88. See COLEMAN, supra note 68, at 304, 367–69; WEINRIB, supra note 68, at 134. 
 89. WEINRIB, supra note 68, at 9–10 (calling this normative link that “master feature” of 
tort law); Coleman, supra note 71, at 185. 
 90. See COLEMAN, supra note 68, at 346-47; WEINRIB, supra note 68, at 169–70.  
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Explanations of tort practices that focus on correlativity differ from explanations 
of tort practices that rely on facts external to the relationship between victim and 
wrongdoer. For example, positive economic analyses of tort law might explain our 
tort practices as an implicit search for the cheapest cost avoider.91 This explanation 
relies on facts external to the relationship between the parties and therefore links 
the parties together in a lawsuit in ways that are contingent rather than inherent in 
their relationship to one another.  
Consider Coleman’s discussion of deterrence, which Weinrib largely echoes.92 
Coleman claims that when the plaintiff and the defendant are linked by something 
other than the relationship of victim and wrongdoer, tort law is not expressing the 
correlativity that is essential to corrective justice.93 Coleman offers an example 
similar to the following one:94 Suppose a manufacturer produces a product that is 
safe for most purposes but should not be used for other purposes. One should not, 
for example, use a chainsaw to cut metal pipe. The manufacturer included an 
insufficient warning with its product. A victim is hurt by the product. But this 
victim never read the warning, and so there is no causal link between the 
insufficient warning and the harm. In short, the manufacturer’s actions did not 
harm the victim because the victim would have used the product as she did 
regardless of the content of the warning. The victim would, if anything, be acting as 
a private attorney general if she sued. The victim and the manufacturer are not in 
the type of relationship that tort law normally requires to justify liability because 
the defendant did not cause the harm.95 There may be reasons to impose liability in 
such a case—for example, to deter defective warnings—but imposing liability in 
this case would not express corrective justice.96 At most, deterrence can only 
explain why we impose liability on the defendant; it cannot explain why the 
plaintiff should collect those damages.  
3. Rectification 
The last feature of all corrective justice theories is rectification. All corrective 
justice accounts impose duties of repair on the wrongdoer.97 Further, they do so 
because of the normative link between victim and wrongdoer.98 This link serves as 
the justification for imposing duties of repair.  
Allocative and relational accounts of corrective justice differ regarding what 
rectification entails. Allocative accounts of tort remedies focus on rectifying 
losses.99 Relational accounts focus on rectifying wrongs.100  
                                                                                                                 
 
 91. See COLEMAN, supra note 68, at 380–81. 
 92. For a concise description of Weinrib’s views on deterrence, see WEINRIB, supra note 
68, at 212. 
 93. See COLEMAN, supra note 68, at 386–87. 
 94. Id. at 387. 
 95. See id. at 387, 399. 
 96. Id. at 387–88. 
 97. Weinrib, supra note 80, at 129. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Coleman, supra note 71, at 184.  
 100. Weinrib, supra note 12, at 349; see WEINRIB, supra note 68, at 130–31. 
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Coleman offers a standard allocative account of tort law: “[I]ndividuals who are 
responsible for the wrongful losses of others have a duty to repair the losses.”101 
This account describes tort law at a high level of generality and leaves a lot unsaid. 
For example, what losses are “wrongful,” for what losses are people “responsible,” 
and what must they do to discharge their duty to repair? Coleman’s notion of 
corrective justice refers to both his general formulation and to the social practices 
that currently give content to concepts of responsibility, wrongfulness, and duty.102  
Relational accounts assert that the “point of a tort action is to undo the injustice 
that the defendant has done to the plaintiff.”103 Our current tort practices are 
concrete illustrations of this more abstract formulation.104 This formulation leaves a 
lot unsaid as well. When can we attribute the injustice to the defendant? What 
counts as “undoing an injustice”?  
Although both allocative and relational corrective justice accounts developed as 
accounts of existing tort practice,105 corrective justice is not synonymous with 
whatever tort practices happen to be. If it were, then there would be no way to 
criticize some tort practices as failing to embody corrective justice.106 Both 
corrective justice accounts seek to offer a concise and internally coherent 
explanation of the core of tort practices. To the extent that a tort practice is 
inconsistent with the core logic of tort law, it does not embody corrective justice.  
Disgorgement provides a useful example of how a remedy might be 
(in)consistent with the core logic of tort law. Suppose your neighbor rents your 
apartment to vacationers without your permission while you are away, but no harm 
comes to your apartment. You have suffered no losses—you would not have used 
the apartment anyway. However, the law allows you to claim the profits that your 
neighbor made off of his illicit deal.107 This is disgorgement.108 Allocative accounts 
only remedy losses. Therefore, disgorgement remedies do not embody allocative 
                                                                                                                 
 
 101. Coleman, supra note 71, at 184 (emphasis omitted). For more information about 
Coleman’s concept of an “explanation,” see id. at 183.  
 102. Id. at 204. 
 103. Weinrib, supra note 80, at 108. 
 104. Although Coleman uses the term “corrective justice” to refer to the inner logic of a 
set of societal practices that deal with holding a person responsible for the losses that they 
cause others, Weinrib uses the term to refer to the core of tort practices, not to the core of 
some wider set of societal practices. Weinrib, Correlativity, Personality, and the Emerging 
Consensus on Corrective Justice, supra note 80, at 132 n.32. This leads them to look to 
different sets of practices when determining the content of corrective justice. Id.  
 105. See COLEMAN, supra note 68, at 8, 198; Weinrib, supra note 80, at 112 (noting that a 
theory of corrective justice “operates by working back from the principles and concepts of 
private law to the most general ideas latent within them”); id. at 114, 121, 129 n.22 (“In both 
[Colman’s and my] accounts, corrective justice is extracted from the practice or practices in 
which it figures. Coleman misses this point about the juridical conception because he thinks, 
mistakenly, that it is ‘derived’ from some more abstract normative theory.” (citation 
omitted)). 
 106. COLEMAN, supra note 68, at 386 (arguing that not all tort practices embody 
corrective justice); Coleman, supra note 71, at 204–05 
 107. 1 DAN B. DOBBS, DOBBS LAW OF REMEDIES: DAMAGES-EQUITY-RESTITUTION § 1.1, 
at 5 (2d ed. 1993). 
 108. Id. 
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corrective justice.109 Relational accounts, on the other hand, focus on rectifying 
wrongs, rather than losses. Therefore, the fact that the plaintiff suffered no loss is 
irrelevant. Disgorgement undoes the injustice of, for example, using another’s 
property for personal profit.110  
Relational theorists use the fact that tort law recognizes disgorgement to 
undermine allocative accounts that portray tort law as annulling losses. Losses are 
similarly unnecessary in cases of trespass, battery, false imprisonment, and sexual 
harassment.111 In these cases, courts routinely allow nominal damages, punitive 
damages, and injunctions.112 Many common remedial doctrines further loosen the 
connection between tort law and losses. Courts ignore payments to the victim from 
collateral sources like insurance or gains the victim might receive from selling the 
rights to her story to a movie studio.113 In the wrongful death context, courts 
similarly ignore a plaintiff’s remarriage even when the plaintiff claims lost 
consortium.114 These offsetting benefits are relevant under a regime that is 
concerned with returning the victim to her pre-injury level of utility, and yet courts 
ignore them. Hence, proponents of relational corrective justice argue that wrongs, 
not losses, are the primary messes addressed by private law.115  
B. Civil Recourse 
Over the past fifteen years, Benjamin C. Zipursky and John C.P. Goldberg have 
developed an account of tort law that they believe is more accurate than corrective 
justice.116 This account—civil recourse—has powerfully emerged as a potential 
challenger to corrective justice. The central claim of civil recourse theorists is that 
tort law is organized around the idea that the victim should have the option to 
retaliate (in a constrained a legalistic way, of course) against the wrongdoer. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 109. Except when the wrongful gain is simply being used as a proxy for the measure of a 
wrongful loss. 
 110. WEINRIB, supra note 68, at 141–42. 
 111. See Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 77, at 939; Arthur Ripstein, As if It Had Never 
Happened, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1957, 1970, 1993 (2007). 
 112. Compare WEINRIB, supra note 68, at 130–33, with Jules L. Coleman, Tort Law and 
the Demands of Corrective Justice, 67 IND. L.J. 349, 358 (1992) (“Rectifying wrongful 
losses is at the heart of tort law in a way in which rectifying wrongful gains is not.”). 
 113. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 920A cmt. B; 2 DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF 
REMEDIES: DAMAGES-EQUITY-RESTITUTION § 8.6, at 488 (2d ed. 1993). 
 114. 2 DOBBS, supra note 113, § 8.3(7), at 448–49. 
 115. See WEINRIB, supra note 68, at 130–34. For an illuminating history of how courts 
shifted from righting wrongs to annulling losses during the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries, see John C.P. Goldberg, Two Conceptions of Tort Damages: Fair v. Full 
Compensation, 55 DEPAUL L. REV. 435 (2006). 
 116. See, e.g., John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Accidents of the Great 
Society, 64 MD. L. REV. 364 (2005) [hereinafter Goldberg & Zipursky, Accidents]; John C.P. 
Goldberg, The Constitutional Status of Tort Law: Due Process and the Right to a Law for 
the Redress of Wrongs, 115 YALE L.J. 524 (2005); John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. 
Zipursky, Unrealized Torts, 88 VA. L. REV. 1625 (2002) [hereinafter Goldberg & Zipursky, 
Unrealized Torts]; Zipursky, supra note 71; Benjamin C. Zipursky, Rights, Wrongs, and 
Recourse in the Law of Torts, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1 (1998). 
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Civil recourse and relational corrective justice share much in common. For 
example, both put wrongs rather than losses at the core of tort law,117 and both 
view wrongs as relational.118 There are, however, two key differences for purposes 
of this Article. First, civil recourse theorists argue that correlative wrongs trigger a 
plaintiff’s power of redress rather than a defendant’s duty of repair.119 Second, civil 
recourse does not offer a theory of remedies.120 Instead, it highlights the great 
diversity of remedies and suggests that they are relatively unconstrained.  
1. Powers, Not Duties 
Civil recourse theorists seek to explain why the plaintiff has the option to sue.121 
Under relational corrective justice, a correlative wrong triggers a duty of repair.122 
One could interpret this as a legal or a moral duty. Each interpretation causes 
problems for corrective justice theories.  
Wrongs do not trigger legal duties of repair.123 The defendant’s legal duty only 
arises after a successful lawsuit.124 Before this, the defendant merely has “a form of 
vulnerability,” not a legal duty.125 Civil recourse theorists therefore argue that the 
wrong does not trigger a legal duty of repair.  
Shifting focus to moral duties of repair presents problems as well. The existence 
of a moral duty of repair, standing alone, tells us nothing about tort law. We need a 
theory that connects the moral duty to legal obligations. A functionalist account of 
tort law creates the needed link. Under such an account, legal duties of repair exist 
to ensure that wrongdoers fulfill their moral duties of repair. However, corrective 
justice theorists strive to provide a non-functionalist account of tort law; they aspire 
to understand what tort law is, rather than what tort law is for.126 Even if we accept 
such a functional account of tort law, civil recourse theorists argue that there is a 
substantial mismatch between legal and moral duties in tort law. Tort law is 
simultaneously too lax and too harsh. If there is a moral duty of repair, it is unclear 
why the state would delegate to the plaintiff the decision of whether to enforce it. If 
enforcing moral duties is a worthwhile goal, then arguably the state should play a 
                                                                                                                 
 
 117. WEINRIB, supra note 68, at 131, 134; Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 77, at 918. 
 118. Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 77, at 945; Zipursky, supra note 71, at 744. 
 119. See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 27–33 (2d ed. 1997) (distinguishing 
between powers and duties). 
 120. See Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 77, at 962. 
 121. Zipursky, supra note 71, at 733–34. 
 122. WEINRIB, supra note 68 at 135. 
 123. Zipursky, supra note 71, at 718–21. 
 124. See Goldberg & Zipursky, Accidents, supra note 116, at 403 (arguing that redress is 
the “animating idea” of tort law); Goldberg, supra note 116, at 605 (“The core claim of 
redress theory is that tort law’s distinctiveness resides in conferring on individuals . . . a 
power to pursue a legal claim alleging that she . . . has suffered an injury flowing from a 
legal wrong to her by another.”). 
 125. Benjamin C. Zipursky, Two Dimensions of Responsibility in Crime, Tort, and Moral 
Luck, 9 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 97, 110 (2007); see also Zipursky, supra note 71, at 720 
& n.97. 
 126. For further discussion of this point, see Zipursky, supra note 71, at 724–26.  
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larger role in ensuring that moral duties of repair are fulfilled.127 Tort law also 
imposes legal obligations on tortfeasors who have not committed moral wrongs. 
For example, tort law provides a remedy for trespass even when the trespasser 
reasonably believed that she was not trespassing.128 Tort law also forces defendants 
to pay large sums of money to make the plaintiff whole, while it is at least 
debatable whether our moral duties extend this far.129 To be sure, there might be a 
set of pragmatic reasons for this mismatch. However, if this is right, the pragmatic 
concerns rather than the principle of corrective justice would be doing most of the 
explanatory work. And without a theory to explain these pragmatic constraints, 
they may appear ad hoc.  
Based on the above concerns, civil recourse theorists contend that negligently 
injuring another triggers a power to seek redress rather than a duty of repair. 
2. Unconstrained Remedies 
Although civil recourse seeks to explain one additional feature of tort law—the 
plaintiff’s option to sue—it also seeks to explain one fewer feature than corrective 
justice. Remedies, according to civil recourse theorists, are not constrained by the 
animating principles of tort law.130  
Tort law has one set of rules to determine whether a plaintiff has access to 
redress and another set of rules to determine damages. Corrective justice theories 
link these two sets of rules. Under allocative accounts, for example, the event that 
triggered liability—the wrongful loss—also informs the remedy and suggests that 
losses should be annulled.131 Civil recourse denies these links and does not offer an 
alternative theory of tort remedies.132 Given the vast diversity of remedies, civil 
recourse theorists view this as a point in favor of civil recourse.133  
                                                                                                                 
 
 127. Solomon, supra note 14, at 1776–77, 1779 n.73 (arguing that corrective justice 
“does not explain—as civil recourse theory does—why equilibrium is brought about by a 
private lawsuit initiated at the victim’s discretion, given that this state of affairs leads to 
underlitigation on certain legitimate claims, leaving much disequilibrium uncorrected”). This 
argument is not as strong as Solomon believes. As I explained above, corrective justice 
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Michael Abramowicz, On the Alienability of Legal Claims, 114 YALE L.J. 697, 714–17 
(2005) (arguing that alienating tort claims is consistent with corrective justice). For similar 
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Ripstein, supra note 111, at 1981–82. 
 128. For further discussion of this and other examples, see Zipursky, supra note 71, at 
726. 
 129. Id. at 740, 748–49; Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 77, at 966 n.243. 
 130. See Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 77, at 962; Ripstein, supra note 111, at 1963 
(discussing and arguing against the way civil recourse treats remedial choices independently 
from the nature of the wrong); Zipursky, supra note 71, at 748–51.  
 131. Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 77, at 960, 962. 
 132. Id. at 962. 
 133. See id. at 960–963. 
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Punitive damages provide a simple example. Both allocative and relational 
accounts of corrective justice reject punitive damages. These damages are not 
correlatively structured and do not annul losses. Yet our tort practices embrace 
them in many instances.134 Civil recourse theorists provide a stronger descriptive 
account of our tort practices because they contend that remedies might legitimately 
seek to annul losses, undo wrongs, or even to punish the defendant.135 The 
existence of injunctive relief and nominal damages further highlights the diversity 
of remedies that tort law embraces.136 According to civil recourse theories, these 
remedies are constrained by forces outside the inner logic of tort law.137  
III. DEATH AND LOSSES: ALLOCATIVE ACCOUNTS OF CORRECTIVE JUSTICE 
This Part assesses whether allocative corrective justice can support awards for 
wrongful death that correspond to the losses to the decedent, rather than the losses 
to her relatives. This depends on whether death is a loss to the decedent and what it 
means to repair or annul a loss. 
A. Is Death a Loss to The Deceased?  
In the third century B.C., Epicurus argued that death cannot harm us because 
“[d]eath . . . the most awful of evils, is nothing to us, seeing that, when we are, 
death is not come, and, when death is come, we are not.”138 The question “When 
does death harm the decedent?” thus presents a puzzle. If death extinguishes the 
person, then, after her death, there is no longer a subject who can suffer harm. So 
death cannot harm a person after she dies. It also seems unlikely that death can 
harm a person before she dies. The most intuitive view—that death harms the 
victim at the time of her death—is not entirely satisfactory either. If death is an 
instantaneous event—the moment that a set of vital processes stop, for example—
then on one side of this moment one is alive, and not yet harmed by death, and on 
the other side of this moment there is no longer a subject who can suffer harm.  
Since Epicurus first outlined this puzzle, there has been a great deal of 
philosophical debate regarding whether death harms the decedent, and if so, when it 
does so. There are proponents of each possible solution to the timing puzzle: death 
harms the decedent before her death, at the moment of her death, after her death, 
                                                                                                                 
 
 134. 2 DAN DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS § 381, at 1062–75 (2001). 
 135. See Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 77, at 955 (discussing the diversity of 
remedies available in tort law); Anthony J. Sebok, Punitive Damages: From Myth to Theory, 
92 IOWA L. REV. 957, 957 (2007) (“[T]he theory of punitive damages as ‘private 
retribution’—which sounds odd to the modern ear—fits surprisingly well with modern 
theories of the tort system that view tort law as a system of civil recourse for citizens who 
have suffered wrongs in private law.”). 
 136. Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 77, at 955; Zipursky, supra note 71, at 748. 
 137. See Goldberg, supra note 116, at 602–03 (noting that sometimes an apology is 
insufficient “satisfaction” for the victim). 
 138. 2 DIOGENES LAERTIUS, LIVES OF EMINENT PHILOSOPHERS 651 (R.D. Hicks trans., 
Harvard University Press, 1975) (emphasis added). 
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and death is a type of harm that need not be located in time.139 The timing puzzle 
will come up again in the context of whether people can be harmed by events that 
take place after their death. I will postpone discussion of it until then. I do so for 
two reasons. First, the intuition that our death would harm us is powerful, enduring, 
and almost ubiquitous.140 Despite the philosophical debate, few are likely to argue 
that death is not a harm to the decedent. But the intuitive case for posthumous harm 
is much weaker. The more pressing obstacle to applying allocative corrective 
justice to wrongful death is the issue of whether events after our death can benefit 
or harm us. Second, the solutions to the timing puzzle discussed below in the 
context of posthumous harms will also apply to death itself. For example, if 
posthumous events can harm the victim when they occur, then death can harm her 
after her death.141  
B. What Does It Mean To “Repair” or “Annul” a Loss?  
The duty of repair imposed by allocative corrective justice is the duty to repair 
or annul the losses that the victim suffers. Annulling a loss is normally thought to 
make the victim “whole” or to restore her to the position that she would have been 
in had the wrong not occurred.142 The make-whole account of tort damages is 
aspirational only. To truly make someone whole would require undoing the injury. 
This is rarely possible, even for purely monetary losses. Some psychological 
remainder is likely to exist even if a wrongdoer steals $10,000 and repays it in full. 
It is sometimes possible to offset harms with corresponding gains.143 For example, 
pain might be offset or made-up for by a Mediterranean cruise. Even if the cruise 
cannot fully offset past pain on any cardinal scale of welfare, it could provide some 
small degree of solace to the sufferer. Although the cruise does not undo the pain, 
and it may not fully offset it, the cruise can still legitimately be called 
“compensation” for the pain that goes some way toward making the victim whole.  
                                                                                                                 
 
 139. For an overview of each position, see LUPER, supra note 10, at 126–139, and BEN 
BRADLEY, WELL-BEING AND DEATH 84–111 (2009). 
 140. See John Martin Fischer, Introduction to THE METAPHYSICS OF DEATH 3, 16 (John 
Martin Fischer ed. 1993) (“Most philosophers have wished to resist the Epicurean 
conclusion.”). 
 141. Although this may sound odd, it has some intuitive appeal as well. People are 
harmed when they are deprived of utility, and therefore they are harmed after their death, at 
the time during which they would have otherwise experienced utility. BRADLEY, supra note 
139, at 93.  
 142. 1 DOBBS, supra note 107, § 1.1, at 3 (“The damages remedy is a money remedy 
aimed at making good the plaintiff’s losses.”); 4 FOWLER V. HARPER, FLEMING JAMES, JR. & 
OSCAR S. GRAY, THE LAW OF TORTS § 25.1, at 493 (2d ed. 1986) (noting that compensation 
entails “repairing plaintiff’s injury or . . . making him whole”); DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, 
MODERN AMERICAN REMEDIES: CASES AND MATERIALS 15–16 (2d ed. 1994) (“[T]he essence 
of compensatory damages” is placing the victim back in her “rightful position.”); Zipursky, 
supra note 71, at 698, 700 (identifying corrective justice accounts with the make whole 
approach). 
 143. This would place the victim back on her indifference curve, but not at the some 
point on that curve that she occupied before the accident.  
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Death presents a special challenge for the make-whole approach. The idea of 
offsetting, or making-up for, or providing solace for, death requires that the victim 
benefit from the posthumous award. The next section, therefore, addresses the 
possibility that the dead can benefit from events that take place after their death. 
C. Posthumous Benefits  
The issue of whether posthumously satisfied desires can benefit their 
erstwhile holders is a hotly debated one. Some people find it just 
obvious that the dead can be neither benefitted nor harmed, while 
others find it equally obvious that lives are capable of retroactive . . . 
improvement.144 
Consider Eric Posner and Cass Sunstein’s pithy comment: “The dead person 
cannot be compensated—she is dead.”145 On hedonic accounts of welfare, this is 
certainly true.146 On these accounts, welfare is derived from subjective states that 
one must experience.147 Since the dead cannot experience the effects of an event, 
their welfare remains unaffected by those events.148  
Preference-based accounts of welfare are often thought to be more plausible 
than hedonic accounts, and preference-based accounts allow for the possibility of 
posthumous harms and benefits.149 Consider a betrayed husband.150 He loves his 
wife but she secretly despises him and has an ongoing affair with the real father of 
all of the family’s children. Is he harmed by these facts? Relying on preference-
based accounts of welfare, many say yes, even though the husband is blissfully 
unaware of them.151 He suffers harm because his preference for a loving wife goes 
unfulfilled.  
                                                                                                                 
 
 144. L.W. SUMNER, WELFARE, HAPPINESS, AND ETHICS 127 (1996). 
 145. Posner & Sunstein, supra note 3, at 558. The authors find it equally obvious that 
death harms the decedent. Id. at 576. 
 146. There are three major accounts of welfare—hedonic, preference-based, and 
objective-good accounts. Under hedonic accounts, welfare is entirely constituted by 
subjective experiences. Under preference-based accounts, people are better off when their 
preferences are satisfied. Under objective good accounts, people are better off if their lives 
contain more of some pre-determined list of goods like love, education, health, courage, etc. 
For a general discussion, see MATTHEW D. ADLER & ERIC A. POSNER, NEW FOUNDATIONS OF 
COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS 29–32 (2006) and LUPER, supra note 10, at 88–97.  
 147. ADLER & POSNER, supra note 146, at 29. 
 148. See Douglas W. Portmore, Desire Fulfillment and Posthumous Harm, 44 AM. PHIL. 
Q. 27, 27 (2007). 
 149. John Bronsteen, Christopher Buccafusco & Jonathan S. Masur, Welfare as 
Happiness, 98 GEO. L.J. 1583, 1616–26 (2010) (surveying the arguments in favor of 
preferentialism and attempting to refute them).  
 150. This example is a modified version of one given in George Pitcher, The Misfortunes 
of the Dead, 21 AM. PHIL. Q. 183, 186 (1984). For other examples, see 1 JOEL FEINBERG, 
HARM TO OTHERS: THE MORAL LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 90–91 (1984). 
 151. See, e.g., John Martin Fischer, Epicureanism About Death and Immortality, 10 J. 
ETHICS 355, 373 (2006). 
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Many proponents of posthumous harm then make an analogy between unknown 
events and posthumous events.152 If unknown events can harm someone than so too 
can posthumous events. Consider a new example. A mother has a young son. The 
son will die soon from a rare disease. But the family is doubly unlucky and the 
mother dies first. Is the mother harmed by her son’s subsequent death? In each 
example, someone has a preference for an objective state of the world (for a loving 
wife, or a son that will grow up happy and healthy). In each example, this 
preference goes unfulfilled. So perhaps both the betrayed husband and the dead 
mother suffer harm.153  
But the analogy between unknown events and posthumous events has 
weaknesses: the Epicurean timing puzzle problematizes this analogy. If the son’s 
death harmed the mother, when did it do so? The most natural answer is: when he 
died.154 If death extinguished the person who was the mother, then the harm 
occurred at a time when the mother was not in existence to suffer harm.155  
There are several ways to deal with this puzzle. Consider two.156 First, Joel 
Feinberg argues that the mother suffers harm before she dies, while she is alive. 
The harm to her starts when she develops an interest that will ultimately be 
thwarted by her son’s death.157 The mother is harmed because one of her strong 
interests was doomed.158 Feinberg’s solution to the timing puzzle is the most 
widely accepted.159 Second, Martha Nussbaum argues that the son’s death alters the 
value or significance of the mother’s life, and it does so when the son dies.160 The 
concept of altering the value of the mother’s life is not necessarily identical to the 
concept of harming the mother.161 Yet Nussbaum suggests that it is at least 
                                                                                                                 
 
 152. See id. at 359–60, 373. 
 153. LUPER, supra note 10, at 135. But see Portmore, supra note 148, at 27 (arguing that 
the best versions of a preference-based account of welfare would exclude preferences for 
posthumous states of the world). 
 154. LUPER, supra note 10, at 197; Joan Callahan, On Harming the Dead, 97 ETHICS 341, 
346 (1987). 
 155. Notice that this problem (the problem of the nonexistent subject) occurs for 
posthumous harms but not unknown harms. 
 156. For further solutions to the timing puzzle, see BRADLEY, supra note 139, at 84–111; 
LUPER, supra note 10, at 126–39; DANIEL SPERLING, POSTHUMOUS INTERESTS: LEGAL AND 
ETHICAL PERSPECTIVES 25–34 (2008). 
 157. FEINBERG, supra note 150, at 55, 92; see also Pitcher, supra note 150, at 187. 
 158. FEINBERG, supra note 150, at 55; LUPER, supra note 10, at 135 (“Slanderous claims 
made after I am dead make it true that my reputation is to be sullied, and this harms me all 
the while I want my reputation to be good after I am gone. It is while alive that I have the 
desire; while alive that my welfare level is lower.”). For a further discussion of this 
argument, see BRADLEY, supra note 139, at 24, 87. 
 159. See BRADLEY, supra note 139, at 23; LUPER, supra note 10, at 139 (labeling this 
“prioritism” and rejecting competing theories of posthumous harm); Portmore, supra note 
148, at 27 (describing this as the standard account of posthumous harm). 
 160. Martha Nussbaum, Replies, 10 J. ETHICS 463, 473–74 (2006). 
 161. Nussbaum refers to posthumous events as potentially affecting the “person’s life” 
rather than the “person.” Id. at 473. 
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minimally plausible to say that each is (perhaps in its own way) bad for the 
mother.162  
Neither of these solutions provides fully satisfactory response to the puzzle. 
Feinberg’s solution appears to require a deterministic universe where the future is 
already set in stone. The son’s death is preordained, and hence “dooms” the 
mother’s interest from the moment she adopts it.163 But determinism carries with it 
its own puzzles, and potentially undermines the theory of personal responsibility 
that undergirds relational corrective justice.164 Nussbaum’s comments were 
preliminary,165 and thus she has not yet fully elaborated the potential differences 
between the son’s death being bad for the mother’s life and it being bad for the 
mother. But she remains rightly skeptical that they are each harmful to the 
mother.166 The mother’s life and the mother are not the same. It seems most natural 
to say that the mother’s life can be made more or less successful by posthumous 
events, while only the mother can potentially be harmed by posthumous events. So 
shifting focus to the mother’s life may solve the timing puzzle at the cost of asking 
the wrong question.  
D. Summary of Lost Life Damages Under Allocative Corrective Justice 
Allocative accounts provide a very narrow logical space for lost life damages. 
Such damages would comport with allocative corrective justice only if death harms 
the decedent, and the decedent can benefit from posthumous events. The timing 
puzzle remains a substantial barrier to the possibility of posthumous benefits. 
Given the current stalemate in the theoretical arguments about posthumous 
harms,167 and the impossibility of identifying a fully satisfying solution to the 
timing puzzle, it is doubtful that allocative corrective justice can provide a solid 
justification for lost life damages. The remainder of this Article will remain 
                                                                                                                 
 
 162. Id. at 473–75; see also BRADLEY, supra note 139, at 97 (“Perhaps it is true that, 
given the ordinary meanings of terms like ‘harm’ and ‘bad,’ something cannot be bad for a 
person at a time when that person does not exist. I do not know how to resolve this question 
about language, but I do not think it is necessary to do so. If it is true that the ordinary 
meanings of these terms preclude their use in the way I suggest, then we should revise our 
ordinary use of these terms.”); THOMAS NAGEL, Death, in MORTAL QUESTIONS 1, 6 (1979) 
(“A man’s life includes much that does not take place within the boundaries of his body and 
his mind, and what happens to him can include much that does not take place within the 
boundaries of his life.”); Fischer, supra note 151, at 373 (arguing that the non-existence of 
the subject should not matter to determinations of harm). 
 163. See FEINBERG, supra note 150, at 91 (“The . . . person was harmed in being the 
subject of interests that were going to be defeated whether he knew it or not.”) (emphasis 
added); LOREN E. LOMASKY, PERSONS, RIGHTS, AND THE MORAL COMMUNITY 219–20 (1987); 
Julian Lamont, A Solution to the Puzzle of When Death Harms Its Victims, 76 
AUSTRALASIAN J. PHIL. 198, 202 (1998). 
 164. See Anders Kaye, Powerful Particulars: The Real Reason the Behavioral Sciences 
Threaten Criminal Responsibility, 37 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 539, 550–51 (2010). 
 165. See Nussbaum, supra note 160, at 463. 
 166. Id. at 472 (resisting arguments that attempt to downplay the importance of non-
existence for the attribution of harm). 
 167. Fischer, supra note 151, at 370–71. 
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agnostic about whether the dead can benefit from posthumous events, and explore 
whether other theories of tort law embrace lost life damages.  
IV. DEATH AND WRONGS: RELATIONAL ACCOUNTS OF CORRECTIVE JUSTICE 
Two aspects of relational accounts appear to point to opposite conclusions about 
whether awarding lost life damages would be consistent with corrective justice. 
The required correlative shape of the duty of repair highlights several new 
obstacles. However, the flexibility regarding the content of the duty of repair 
eliminates several old obstacles.  
A. The Challenge of Correlativity 
Under relational corrective justice, the remedy must undo the wrong. In order to 
understand what might undo the wrong, we need to attend to the structure of the 
wrong itself,168 because the relational nature of the wrong has implications for the 
proper remedy.169  
The heart of a corrective injustice is that it is relational.170 Corrective justice 
concerns situations where, for example, John wrongs Sally. John and Sally’s 
interaction did not create an injustice merely by virtue of what John did, or merely 
by virtue of what happened to Sally. The relevant injustice exists because of the 
link between what John did and what Sally suffered.171 Weinrib describes this link 
using the terms correlative, relational, and bipolar.172 One of the central tenants of 
relational corrective justice is that only relational remedies can undo relational 
wrongs.173  
What does it mean for a remedy to be relational? A first-cut response might be 
that it requires John to give something of value to Sally. Consider for example 
Weinrib’s comments on the role of damages: “[D]amages represent in monetary 
terms . . . the injustice committed by the defendant upon the plaintiff. Through the 
mechanism of the damage award, a qualitatively unique moral event (the particular 
injustice done and suffered) receives the quantitative expression that enables it to 
be reversed through a monetary transfer.”174 The language of “revers[ing]” the 
                                                                                                                 
 
 168. Weinrib, supra note 12. 
 169. Id.; WEINRIB, supra note 68, at 65; Ernest J. Weinrib, Two Conceptions of Remedies, 
in JUSTIFYING PRIVATE LAW REMEDIES 3, 12 (Charles E.F. Rickett ed., 2008). 
 170. See WEINRIB, supra note 68, at 10; Weinrib, supra note 12, at 350. 
 171. Weinrib, supra note 12, at 350 (“[W]hat the defendant has done counts as an 
injustice only because of what the defendant has suffered . . . . [E]ach party’s position is 
normatively significant only through the position of the other, which is the mirror image of 
it.”). The link between defendant and plaintiff is provided by a theory of legal responsibility 
that is worked out in its specifics by a series of individual tort cases and may differ from 
more general theories of moral responsibility. Id. at 353. 
 172. Id. at 350–51. 
 173. Weinrib, supra note 169, at 5 (“[T]he remedy has to replicate the structure of the 
injustice, retracing and reversing the movement between the parties.”). 
 174. Ernest J. Weinrib, Restitutionary Damages as Corrective Justice, 1 THEORETICAL 
INQUIRIES L. 1, 4 (2000). 
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wrong through a monetary “transfer” implies that the plaintiff must receive 
whatever courts take from the defendant.175 Other passages lend further credibility 
to this claim.176 This would present problems for lost life damages, where the 
plaintiff can no longer personally receive the monetary transfer.  
Another way to illustrate the potential tension between correlativity and lost life 
damages is to focus on the relationship between doer and sufferer.177 Doer and 
sufferer are locked in a normative relationship. This relationship is integral to the 
imposition of liability. One might posit that this relationship ceases when the victim 
dies. By similar reasoning, the relationship would cease when the wrongdoer dies. 
If either dies, then perhaps there is no longer a justification for imposing liability.  
The above arguments misread the requirement of correlativity. To see why, 
consider tort liability from John’s perspective. Must John pay Sally, or can he 
purchase insurance, such that the insurance company will pay Sally? The consensus 
among corrective justice theorists is that insurance contracts do not undermine the 
correlative structure of standard tort remedies.178 This is because corrective justice 
seeks to illuminate a set of justificatory practices.179 It is concerned with the 
reasons we give to justify making John an obligor and Sally his obligee.180 It is not 
                                                                                                                 
 
 175. Id. Weinrib at times even implies that the plaintiff must be alive to initiate the suit. 
See Weinrib, supra note 169, at 12 (“[T]he remedy must operate not merely on one party or 
the other but on the relationship between them. Just as the [wrong] directly links the parties 
as the active and passive poles of an injustice, so the remedy treats the parties as the active 
and passive poles in the removal of that injustice.”). 
 176. See, e.g., WEINRIB, supra note 68, at 143 (“The origin, destination, and quantum of 
the damages can be understood together: a particular quantum is taken from a particular 
defendant because it is paid to a particular plaintiff.”); id. at 144 (“Whether the issue is the 
ground of the claim or the mechanics of processing it, each litigant’s position is the mirror 
image of the other’s.”). 
 177. These are Weinrib’s terms. WEINRIB, supra note 68, at 65. They map onto 
Coleman’s terms “wrongdoer” and “victim” respectively. See COLEMAN, supra note 68, at 
370–71. 
 178. Allan Beever, Corrective Justice and Personal Responsibility in Tort Law, 28 
OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 475, 498 (2008) (“According to the corrective justice theorist, the 
reason insurance is irrelevant in tort is not because insurance undermines the defendant’s 
personal responsibility but because insurance is external to the relationship between the 
claimant and the defendant. Therefore, though the corrective justice theorist agrees that 
courts should ignore insurance, she does not hold that liability insurance should be illegal. In 
fact . . . she can accept the way that liability insurance is treated by Commonwealth law.”); 
Jeffrey O’Connell & Christopher J. Robinette, “Choice Auto Insurance”: Do Theories of 
Justice Require Linkage Between Injurers and the Injured?, 1997 U. ILL. L. REV. 1109, 1133 
(“The source of money paid to the injured does not negate the evaluation of the agent’s 
actions, a point conceded by Perry in tolerating third-party liability insurance. Deciding 
whether one’s actions are defensible is an evaluation logically distinct from the question of 
the source of compensating for the tort.”). 
 179. Weinrib, supra note 12, at 355 (“A corrective justice approach attempts to discern 
the normative character of liability as a familiar practice within which justification has a 
pervasive role. A corrective justice approach takes the justificatory ambitions of this practice 
seriously by focusing on the law's internal normative dimension.”). 
 180. WEINRIB, supra note 68, at 143–44 (“[T]he justification for obligating the defendant 
to pay is correlative to the justification for entitling the plaintiff to be paid. Neither 
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concerned with how John’s obligation is ultimately discharged. As Weinrib notes at 
the end of a long footnote: “Corrective justice goes to the nature of the obligation; 
it does not prescribe the mechanism by which the obligation is discharged. Liability 
insurance presupposes liability, and it is that liability which is intelligible in the 
light of corrective justice.”181 
Put another way, corrective justice reflects the inner logic of tort law, not the 
inner logic of the laws regulating debt. The imposition of the duty itself fully 
satisfies corrective justice. This is not to say that we should be indifferent to 
whether this duty is discharged. But corrective justice speaks only to the 
justifications for imposing the duty, other normative concerns regulate the manner 
in which the defendant discharges his duty. Thus we might rightly ask whether 
Donald Trump can pay the defendant’s debt to the plaintiff,182 but our answer will 
not draw upon the principles of corrective justice. Those principles are exhausted 
when a judge imposes the duty.183 So while the correlative nature of the injustice 
has implications for the types of reasons that tort law can use to justify imposing a 
duty of repair, it does not have implications for the factual sequence of events that 
serve to discharge that duty. 
Just as corrective justice does not require John to personally pay Sally, it does 
not require Sally to personally receive the payment. Consider a remedy that will be 
discussed further in Part VI: paying lost life damages to the victim’s estate. A duty 
to pay the victim’s estate meets the requirements of correlativity. Just as private 
insurance contracts can effectively allow the insurance company to stand in the 
shoes of the obligor, so too can probate codes allow the executor of the estate to 
stand in the shoes of the obligee. Consider also a suggestion of Andrew McClurg 
that courts require the defendant to fund a memorial to the victim.184 This too 
would be a correlative remedy. The only difference is that here, the defendant owes 
the estate a specific performance rather than a monetary payment. Correlativity 
does not require that John and Sally remain alive until the termination of a lawsuit. 
The relevant relationship commences when John wronged Sally. It is the central 
importance of this relational wrong that explains why tort law concerns itself with 
causation, duty, and foreseeability. These concepts link John’s action to Sally’s 
harm. It is this link that provides the necessary justification for tort liability, not the 
continued existence of either John or Sally.  
The above analysis starts with concrete examples of bipolar remedies and 
proceeds by analogy to argue that the plaintiff’s death does not foreclose the 
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remedy consists not in two independent operations—one penalizing the defendant and the 
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 181. WEINRIB, supra note 68, at 135–136 n.25. 
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327–28, 389. 
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possibility of imposing a bipolar remedy. We get to the same result when we 
instead generate and apply a general definition of bipolar remedies. 
Recall that only bipolar remedies can undo bipolar wrongs. A remedy is bipolar 
if it is justified by the combination of agency, legal responsibility, and harm that 
can be succinctly described as: “John wronged Sally.” It will help to unpack the 
elements of this injustice into three parts. First, John committed a wrong. Second, 
Sally suffered a wrong. Third, John committed the wrong that Sally suffered. In 
order to be correlative, a remedy must reflect each of these elements.  
To illustrate the necessity of each element, consider punitive damages, 
deterrence, and compensation. Punitive damages are not correlative.185 It will be 
useful to distinguish between two forms of punitive damages. The first is triggered 
by some especially outrageous conduct by the defendant.186 Unless the 
outrageousness of the defendant’s conduct increases the victim’s harm,187 this type 
of liability is not correlative because its justification is indifferent to the bipolar 
relationship of the parties. Nothing has to be said about the victim to generate these 
damages.188 They are justified instead by the idea that John committed a certain 
type of wrong, or John wronged someone in a certain way. These punitive damages 
neglect one of the three elements of the wrong: the fact that it was Sally who was 
wronged. The second form of punitive damages is triggered by the fact that not all 
victims will sue, and hence we need some multiplier to create adequate 
deterrence.189 Nothing has to be said about the victim to generate these damages 
either. They are justified by the idea that John wronged some set of other people. 
None of the rationales for punitive damages, nor any deterrence-based rationale, 
relies on the fact that Sally was the particular person who was wronged.190 
Conversely, compensatory rationales for tort remedies only rely on the fact that 
Sally was wronged.191 They ignore the fact that John was the particular person who 
wronged Sally. Thus, pure compensatory rationales suggest that we should move 
toward a New Zealand-style accident compensation scheme where anyone who 
suffers a loss may recover regardless of how the loss occurred. Even if we combine 
the deterrence rationale with the compensation rationale, we still ignore the third 
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for this harm when it does not fall under traditional compensatory categories). 
 188. See WEINRIB, supra note 68, at 212. 
 189. A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Punitive Damages: An Economic Analysis, 
111 HARV. L. REV. 869, 887–96 (1998) (“[I]f a defendant can sometimes escape liability for 
the harm for which he is responsible, the proper magnitude of damages is the harm the 
defendant has caused, multiplied by a factor reflecting the probability of his escaping 
liability.” (emphasis omitted)). 
 190. See WEINRIB, supra note 68, at 121–22. 
 191. Id. at 121. 
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element: the relationship between John and Sally. The deterrence rationale relies on 
the fact that John wronged someone. The compensation rationale relies on the fact 
that Sally was wronged by someone. Neither relies on the fact that John committed 
the wrong that Sally suffered. So in a standard case, the combination of deterrence 
and compensation rationales would justify taking money from John, and giving 
money to Sally, but it would not explain why Sally should get the money taken 
from John.192 A standard tort award is correlative because it can only be explained 
by reference to all three elements of “John wronged Sally.” 
If all three elements of the relationship must play a role in justifying liability, 
then the obligation imposed by the duty of repair must include a feature that is 
justified only by reference to the particular sufferer.193 This can happen without 
Sally benefiting from, or even being aware of, the remedy. Consider a public 
apology. We do not need to refer to Sally’s plight to justify forcing the defendant to 
say, “I regret what happened.” In contrast, we must refer to Sally’s plight in order 
to justify forcing the defendant to say, “I regret what I did to Sally.” As long as a 
remedy is justified by all three elements of the injustice, it will be correlative.194  
Requiring John to pay Sally’s estate is a correlative remedy. Sally’s estate is the 
legal receptacle for all of Sally’s claims and debts. The estate is her personal 
representative. The justification for requiring John to pay Sally’s estate is that John 
owed Sally something. Thus, Sally’s plight is a necessary element in justifying this 
remedy.195  
To summarize, imposing a correlative remedy is a necessary condition of 
undoing a wrong.196 Any obligation that reflects the correlative structure of the 
injustice will itself be correlative. An obligation will reflect the correlative structure 
of the injustice when it is grounded in justifications that are themselves 
correlatively structured. And that in turn requires that all three elements of “John 
wronged Sally” serve to justify the obligation imposed on the defendant. Although 
this can be accomplished by obligating the defendant to pay the plaintiff, this is not 
the only type of remedy that meets the requirements of correlativity. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 192. Id. at 43 (“[T]here is no reason to connect a particular application of deterrence with 
a particular award of compensation.”); id. at 121–22. 
 193. Of course, it also must include a feature that is justified only by reference to the 
defendant and a feature that is justified only by reference to the relationship. Normally these 
features would be, respectively, the fact that the defendant is an obligor and the fact that the 
defendant’s obligation is to the plaintiff. 
 194. This interpretation illustrates why Coleman was wrong to suggest that prison 
sentences might undo the wrong. COLEMAN, supra note 68, at 321. A prison sentence would 
not undo the wrong because it is not correlatively structured. Nor would a fine, or probation, 
or community service. None of these potential obligations require Sally as part of their 
justification. They all rely merely on the idea that the defendant wronged someone, rather 
than that he wronged Sally. 
 195. Of course, many other remedies would be correlative. Requiring John to pay Sally’s 
mother is correlative. The fact that this remedy is correlative, however, does not mean that it 
will undo the wrong. Correlativity is a necessary but not sufficient condition of undoing a 
wrong. A substantive moral judgment must be made about the fit between the wrong and the 
remedy. The next section will further address this notion of “fit.” 
 196. It is not a sufficient condition, however. See infra Part IV.B.  
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B. The Challenge of Content: The Affirmative Case for Lost Life Damages 
The remedial flexibility of relational accounts comes at a potential cost. It 
arguably leaves policy makers with no guidance as to which of all the possible 
correlatively structured remedies tort law should adopt. But not all correlatively 
structured remedies will equally “undo the injustice.” Consider the simple case 
where a victim loses a leg and the court awards her fifty cents. This remedy is 
correlatively structured. Indeed, it would probably involve the simplest case where 
the defendant pays money directly to the plaintiff. Yet we would probably agree 
that the award was too small. This example shows two things. First, correlativity is 
a necessary but not sufficient condition of a remedy that undoes a wrong. 
Relational corrective justice also requires us to make a substantive judgment about 
whether a potential remedy fits the wrong. Second, there are probably areas of 
agreement about this substantive judgment even if there are also large gray areas. 
Even if there are disagreements about which remedy provides the best fit, we can 
all agree that undoing the wrong of negligently depriving someone of a limb 
requires more than a fifty cent payment. 
In order to get a better sense of the how to assess the fit between wrongs and 
remedies, first consider one isolated aspect of a wrong: its purely economic effects 
on the victim. There is a close fit between economic harm and monetary damages. 
If someone damages your car and forces you to spend $100 repairing it, damages 
can replace this $100 loss. Damages can undo economic injury. Thus, monetary 
damages are particularly appropriate for economic injuries; there is an obvious fit 
between the wrong and the remedy. Undoing, or at least mitigating, the harm plays 
a large role in undoing the wrong.  
The fit between monetary remedies and the noneconomic effects of a wrong are 
less obvious, but just as strong. Monetary damages cannot undo pain felt by the 
victim. One cannot award anti-pain that will retroactively remove past pain. It is 
perhaps this sort of observation that has led some academics and legislators to 
criticize the entire practice of awarding damages for pain and suffering.197 But 
despite such attacks, these damages have remained quite resilient. All states 
recognize pain and suffering as legitimate bases for awarding monetary damages, 
and such awards are common. Although approximately half of the states cap pain 
and suffering damages, the caps still allow substantial awards (caps range from 
$250,000 to $500,000).198 In the language of relational corrective justice, a 
monetary award can apparently go some way toward undoing the wrong without 
undoing the pain. This is because literally undoing past pain is not the only way to 
forge the appropriate fit between pain and monetary damages. 
The fit between pain and monetary remedies becomes clear when viewed 
through the lens of their welfare effects. Both pain and monetary remedies have 
hedonic welfare effects. To be sure, each is a different dimension of one’s hedonic 
                                                                                                                 
 
 197. See, e.g., Richard Abel, General Damages Are Incoherent, Incalculable, 
Incommensurable, and Inegalitarian (but Otherwise a Great Idea), 55 DEPAUL L. REV. 253, 
258, 323–24 (2006). 
 198. See Ronen Avraham, Database of State Tort Law Reforms (DSTLR 4th) (Univ. Tex. 
Sch. of Law, Law & Econ. Research Paper No. 184, 2011), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=902711. 
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welfare. Money does not undo pain, and pain does not make one poorer. But their 
effects on overall hedonic welfare are clear and important. When viewed in light of 
these effects, monetary remedies are not intended to undo pain, but rather mitigate 
one aspect of its negative effects. For example, a Mediterranean cruise might offset 
or make-up for pain.199 Even if the cruise cannot fully offset the hedonic welfare 
effects of past pain, it could provide some small degree of solace to the sufferer.200 
Although the cruise does not undo the pain, and it may not fully offset it, the cruise 
can improve the victim’s hedonic welfare. This mitigates the negative hedonic 
welfare effects of the injury.  
Like pain and suffering damages, the fact that fatal wrongs cannot be undone 
does not mean that monetary remedies are not an appropriate response. The fit 
between pain and monetary remedies only became clear when viewed through a 
welfare lens. The fit between death and monetary remedies will become clear when 
viewed through the lens of life projects.  
Part of the tragedy of death stems from the way it cuts off our ability to affect 
the world. This is a tremendous loss because everyone has goals and aims that 
require affecting the world. In order to understand more fully why this is such a 
tremendous loss, consider the idea of a project. People are project pursuers. 
Speaking abstractly, people adopt a conception of the good and cannot be 
indifferent to whether this vision of the good is achieved or not.201 On a more 
concrete level, people have goals or ends that relate to their idea of what is 
worthwhile to pursue in life. Parents, for example, actively work to ensure that their 
children flourish.  
Projects are a subset of one’s ends or desires.202 The boundary between projects 
and other ends is fuzzy, but it is nonetheless useful and conceptually familiar to 
distinguish projects as a special class of ends.203 Roughly speaking, projects are 
those ends that are relatively well-considered, enduring, and important. People 
adopt, endorse, or embrace their projects. They are not reflexively or unthinkingly 
acted upon. The momentary desire to scratch an itch is not a project. Projects tend 
to be relatively stable and provide durable reasons for us to act. A desire to eat ice 
cream is not a project. A desire to get into the Guinness book of world records by 
eating twenty tons of ice cream is a project. The term “projects” also marks off a 
set of ends that are relatively important to the holder. The desire to see a movie is 
                                                                                                                 
 
 199. See Andrew E. Clark & Andrew J. Oswald, A Simple Statistical Method for 
Measuring How Life Events Affect Happiness, 31 INT’L J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 1139, 1140–41 
(2002) (measuring the effects of life events on self-reported well-being and concluding that 
widowhood could be compensated with £170,000). The concept of offsetting welfare losses 
is what Peter Cane calls called “substitute and solace” compensation. PETER CANE, ATIYAH’S 
ACCIDENTS, COMPENSATION AND THE LAW 413 (7th ed. 2006). 
 200. CANE, supra note 199, at 413. 
 201. CHARLES TAYLOR, SOURCES OF THE SELF: THE MAKING OF THE MODERN IDENTITY 
47–48 (1989). 
 202. LOMASKY, supra note 163, at 26. 
 203. See, e.g., Portmore, supra note 148, at 34 (noting that some philosophers distinguish 
between goals/projects and other desires because “whereas one can desire something and yet 
not intend to do anything to bring it about, a goal does essentially involve an intention to 
make efforts toward its achievement”). 
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unlikely to be a project, even if this desire has been relatively stable. The desire that 
your religion thrive rather than die out is a project. Projects tend to become tied up 
in one’s identity.204 When asked to describe yourself, you might naturally begin 
with your name and basic demographic information, but you would also list some 
of your most identity-conferring projects.  
Everyone has projects. For example, most if not all parents consider their 
children’s’ flourishing to be one of their projects. Others have other types of 
projects. For some, rooting for the Yankees is a project, or spreading the word of 
God, or writing a cookbook, or becoming famous, or raising a prize-winning pig, or 
producing art, or removing graffiti, etc. It is not only a few zealots who have 
projects.205 Everyone has projects.  
Death removes our ability to pursue our projects. The victim of wrongful death 
can no longer exercise her autonomy in the world. More concretely, she can no 
longer work toward giving her children an easier life than her own, ensuring that 
future Americans are secure from terrorist threats, reducing animal cruelty, keeping 
children engaged in elementary school, or any other project that she might have.  
Extending the victim’s ability to influence the world after her death is a fitting 
response to negligently cutting off this ability. Obviously, no remedy can undo 
death. But again, tort law does not aspire to such lofty goals. It instead embraces 
imperfect remedies. Despite the fact that damages cannot undo past pain, tort law 
provides them. Once we shift focus and see both pain and money in terms of their 
effects on hedonic welfare, providing monetary damages is a fitting response.206 
The fit between death and lost life damages is similarly revealed by shifting our 
focus away from perfectly undoing the effects of the wrong. Death is (at least in 
part) the termination of the victim’s ability to influence the world. A tort remedy 
would fit this aspect of death if it could somehow extend the victim’s power to 
influence the world beyond her death. Fortunately, no magic is required to do this.  
The law already provides tools that can extend the victim’s reach beyond her 
own death. Wills allow people to transfer their property upon their death and give 
them a great deal of dead-hand control over the terms and conditions of those 
transfers.207 With the demise of the rule against perpetuities, trusts allow settlors to 
extend dead-hand control indefinitely into the future. Although public policy 
concerns set some limits on dead-hand control,208 people have several powerful 
tools to extend their influence beyond their own lives. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 204. See LOMASKY, supra note 163, at 26–27; BERNARD WILLIAMS, MORAL LUCK: 
PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS 1973–1980, at 12–14 (1981) (arguing that some projects are identity 
conferring in that “unless I am propelled forward by [them], it is unclear why I should go on 
at all”); Daniel Farnham, A Hegelian Theory of Retribution, 39 J. SOC. PHIL. 606, 611–13 
(2008).  
 205. LOMASKY, supra note 163, at 39, 45. 
 206. I am not claiming that pain and suffering damages are a good idea all things 
considered. The practical difficulties of proving and assigning values to pain and suffering 
count as a strike against them. 
 207. Mark L. Ascher, Curtailing Inherited Wealth, 89 MICH. L. REV. 69, 83 (1990). 
 208. See, e.g., Shapira v. Union Nat’l Bank, 315 N.E.2d 825 (Ohio Misc. 1974) 
(discussing public policy limitations on testamentary freedom). 
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Providing money to the estate of the victim is a partial or imperfect way of 
mitigating at least part of what makes death tragic. Consider Sally again. Her 
children are her most important project. But her children are not her only project. 
She is also a member of a religious organization. Therefore, she might well seek to 
further each of these projects in a will or other testamentary instrument. Providing 
money to Sally’s estate does not, of course, increase the number of ways that 
Sally’s autonomous choices can influence the world after she dies. She always had 
the power to write a will. But providing extra money to Sally’s estate provides her 
with more resources to wield with this autonomy. It makes her choices more potent 
and enhances the power of her one final chance to purposefully influence the world. 
This analysis of the fit between death and monetary remedies bears a close 
family resemblance to a broader view of tort remedies provided by Arthur Ripstein. 
According to Ripstein, tort law is a system of means replacement. The wrongs that 
tort law addresses reduce the victim’s power over the means she uses to pursue her 
projects, namely her body and property.209 Remedies seek to restore the victim’s 
means by providing her with the most flexible and transferrable type of means: 
money.  
Ideally, providing the victim with money will enable her to put herself back into 
exactly the same place she was before the accident. That is, she will be able to 
pursue her original projects to the same degree and in the same manner that she did 
before the injury. But this is often not possible.  
When the victim cannot be put back into her pre-injury position, tort law 
embraces a series of imperfect responses to injury. Some injuries foreclose a subset 
of the victim’s ends forever. For example, a traumatic brain injury could potentially 
derail a law student’s hopes to be a successful professor, judge, or lawyer. In these 
cases, tort law might strive for a second-best remedy: to provide her with the means 
to achieve a different set of ends that can be judged as equivalently valuable to her 
original ends. Under a hedonic welfare metric, for example, the remedy might seek 
to provide her with the same amount of utility while acknowledging that this falls 
short of the ideal of putting the victim into the same position she would have been 
in absent the injury. But even this strategy of welfare equalization is often 
impossible. The welfare losses of some injuries are so severe, and marginal utilities 
of money so steep, that money cannot fully offset a welfare setback. In these cases, 
tort law pursues a third-best remedy: to provide the victim with means to achieve 
different ends that will provide her with some lesser amount of utility than she had 
before the accident.  
When the victim dies, tort law must pursue a fourth-best remedy. The only way 
to provide the victim with any means whatsoever is to locate those legal tools that 
can still convert the victim’s means into her ends. These legal tools are wills and 
other testamentary instruments. These are the last vessels of her autonomy. 
Furthering this last flicker of choice is a fitting response to extinguishing the rest of 
it. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 209. Ripstein, supra note 111, at 1970 (“To have something as your means is to have it 
subject to your choice—that is, for you to be the one who decides how it will be used.”); id. 
at 1965, 1967, 1968. 
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The above arguments are not immune to philosophical criticism. According to 
Lucretius, for example, it is impossible to fulfill the preferences of the dead.210 
Death terminates the subject, and preferences—like harms or rights—arguably 
must be ascribed to an existing subject. This might imply that fulfilling the desires 
of the dead is a useless exercise unless it serves some other purpose. We have 
already seen that similar philosophical puzzles have led to debates without clear 
resolution. But this stalemate creates a space where it is defensible to respect the 
preferences of the dead simply because those were their preferences, even if this 
position can defensibly be rejected as well. In such situations, we can look to our 
other legal and cultural practices for guidance.  
Our current legal and cultural practices appear to favor the view that it is 
sensible to talk about the preferences of erstwhile people, and that these preferences 
provide strong reasons for us to act. Testamentary freedom, mortal remains 
statutes, and the rules of organ donation all seek to effectuate the preferences of 
deceased concerning post-death states of the world. For example, courts view 
testator intent as the lodestar of interpreting wills.211 Of course, one could construct 
an explanation of testamentary freedom that relies solely on consequentialist 
concerns for the welfare of the living: testamentary freedom prevents children from 
becoming disobedient, allows parents to shift assets to their most efficient user, 
creates incentives for wealth creation, and incentivizes within-family caregiving at 
the end of life.212 However, these explanations do not ring true. It is even more 
implausible that they fully explain our testamentary practices. People can decide 
who gets their property after their death, at least in part because that property 
belonged to them, and they had a preference that it be disposed of in a certain way. 
This respect for the dead’s preferences extends to the disposition of their corpses as 
well. The Uniform Anatomical Gift Act, which has been adopted by forty-five 
states,213 provides that competent adults’ wishes are dispositive of whether their 
organs can be harvested.214 “Mortal remains” statutes give people the right to 
exercise control over their funeral and, for example, whether they are buried or 
cremated.215 
                                                                                                                 
 
 210. Lamont, supra note 163, at 206. 
 211. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 10.1 
cmt. a (2003) (“The organizing principle of the American law of donative transfers is 
freedom of disposition.”). Of course, there are some public policy exceptions to the freedom 
of testation. See, e.g., Eyerman v. Mercantile Trust Co., 524 S.W.2d 210 (Mo. Ct. App. 
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disinheritance). Nonetheless, testators have a great deal of freedom is disposing of their 
assets. See supra note 188 and accompanying text. 
 212. See Adam J. Hirsch & William K.S. Wang, A Qualitative Theory of the Dead Hand, 
68 IND. L.J. 1, 6–14 (1992) (surveying arguments in favor of testamentary freedom). 
 213. REVISED UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT (2006), Table of Jurisdictions Wherein Act 
Has Been Adopted, 8A U.L.A. 42 (Supp. 2011). 
 214. REVISED UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT (2006) §§ 4, 8, 8A U.L.A. 73, 87–88 (Supp. 
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 215. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45a-318 (West 2011); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 
262 (West 2007); MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH–GEN. § 5-509(a)(1) (“Any individual who is 18 
years of age or older may decide the disposition of the individual’s own body after that 
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Even a decedent’s hypothetical preferences can carry weight. The idea that some 
state of affairs is “what the decedent would have wanted” can be a powerful reason 
to bring that state of affairs about. Again, testator intent is the lodestar of both 
enforcing and reforming wills.216 But our respect for erstwhile preferences goes 
beyond the context of testamentary freedom. When families disagree about how or 
where to bury a decedent, courts often place great weight on what the decedent 
herself would have wanted.217 For example, when a Florida appeals court was 
called upon to decide the fate of Anna Nicole Smith’s remains, it declined to 
analyze the case in terms of which heir had a legal right to the body, and instead 
sought to determine Ms. Smith’s preferences.218 
Although the dead’s preferences are by no means dispositive in all cases,219 the 
above practices suggest that we can sensibly talk about wills as furthering a 
decedent’s projects. Thus, we can say that lost life damages paid to the victim’s 
estate are a way of furthering her projects.  
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cannot defame the dead, see Lisa Brown, Note, Dead but Not Forgotten: Proposals for 
Imposing Liability for Defamation of the Dead, 67 TEX. L. REV. 1525, 1529–41 (1989). 
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C. Summary of Lost Life Damages Under Relational Corrective Justice 
Relational accounts of corrective justice support the life-projects approach to 
lost life damages. At first glance, this account’s concept of correlativity appeared to 
foreclose lost life damages. However, the best view of correlativity allows a host of 
remedies, including monument building and payments to the victim’s estate. 
Among the large set of correlatively structured remedies, those that further the 
victim’s life projects appear particularly likely to undo the wrong. By providing 
money to the victim’s estate, for example, the wrongdoer at least partially or 
imperfectly provides her with means through which to pursue her projects.  
V. DEATH AND RETALIATION: CIVIL RECOURSE 
Civil recourse theory strengthens the main claim of this article: individual 
justice accounts of tort law are consistent with a life-projects approach to lost life 
damages. Zipursky and Goldberg developed civil recourse as an interpretive theory 
of what tort law does, rather than a normative theory about what tort law should 
do.220 As a descriptive organizing principle, civil recourse is arguably consistent 
with multiple different predictions about how the tort practices surrounding 
wrongful death would be set up if these practices were fully consistent with the 
principle of civil recourse. Civil recourse theorists have yet to fully address the 
issue. Nonetheless, below I offer several initial possibilities. Because my main 
focus is normative rather than descriptive, I leave it for civil recourse theorists to 
ultimately decide whether to endorse one of these views or offer another. 
Ultimately, it is only the normative defenses of civil recourse that potentially 
provide reasons to reform tort law. These normative defenses—rooted in fairness, 
natural rights, equality, and mutual accountability—strongly support lost life 
damages. 
A. Descriptive Accounts of Civil Recourse 
As a descriptive organizing principle, civil recourse does not make clear 
predictions about how the tort practices surrounding wrongful death would be set 
up. Although civil recourse theorists have yet to offer sustained commentary on the 
issue, I offer two initial possibilities below. First, civil recourse theorists could 
interpret redress as a personal power that dies with the victim. Second, they could 
interpret redress to allow for others to sue on behalf of, or in the name of, the 
victim.  
A central feature of civil recourse theory is that the victim has the authority or 
power to seek redress. In cases of wrongful death, the victim simply cannot use 
                                                                                                                 
 
 220. Goldberg & Zipursky, Accidents, supra note 116, at 403 (“Our point here is not that 
such a principle is demanded by principles of justice, or even morally sound, but that it is the 
animating idea behind our system of tort law.”); Zipursky, supra note 71, at 735 (“In what 
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the structure of tort law. I will not attempt to justify this principle . . . .”); Zipursky, supra 
note 116, at 6 (“The account I offer is intended to be a framework for a theory of tort law 
that is descriptive, not prescriptive.”).  
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such a power. Therefore, as a starting point we might suppose that tort law remains 
consistent with its animating principle of civil recourse when it ignores the harms 
to deceased victims. In their torts casebook, Goldberg and Zipursky suggest this 
interpretation, but do not offer a sustained defense of it.221  
The personal nature of the power to seek redress seems consistent with 
Goldberg’s focus on “satisfaction.”222 A power to seek redress provides victims 
with the opportunity to obtain satisfaction. Although the concept of satisfaction 
may not be limited to a one-dimensional measure of pleasure, it has an experiential 
ring to it. If this is right, then perhaps tort victims must be able to understand that 
they have been wronged, and be capable of interpreting any resulting award as a 
response to that wrong. A deceased victim lacks the later capacity. This lends 
further support for the claim that the power to seek redress dies with the victim.  
This initial interpretation has drawbacks. Infants, like the dead, cannot exercise 
their power to seek redress. Nor can incompetent adults. Yet the idea of a personal 
representative suing in tort on behalf of infants and incompetent adults is 
commonplace.223 An interpretive theory of tort law should be able to accommodate 
these cases. Infants and some mentally incompetent adults are also arguably 
incapable of obtaining “satisfaction,” at least as defined in the previous paragraph. 
Infants cannot understand that they have been wronged and cannot understand 
responses to that wrong. Late stage Alzheimer’s patients have many more cognitive 
facilities than infants, yet still might not understand that a tort award is connected 
in any way to a now-forgotten wrong. Some of these marginal cases can be 
addressed by bending the concept of satisfaction. Infants will someday be able to 
obtain satisfaction by understanding that they were wronged and that tort law 
responded to that wrong. Mentally incompetent persons might someday have 
moments of clarity. Persons in a coma might someday wake up and similarly obtain 
satisfaction. Perhaps this potential-someday satisfaction is sufficient. But these 
modifications appear ad hoc. This suggests that we should at least explore an 
alternate interpretation of satisfaction. 
Although “satisfaction” has an experiential ring to it, it could be interpreted 
more broadly. If the victim herself cannot sue, perhaps a personal representative 
can decide whether to seek redress in the victim’s name. This would allow for a 
personal representative to sue when the victim is an infant or a mentally 
incompetent adult. It could even allow suits in the name of deceased victims. This 
is what survival statutes currently allow. The causes of action that the deceased 
victim would have possessed had she survived are essentially inherited by her 
estate.  
Other interpretations of civil recourse are, of course, possible. I will let others 
explore further these potential interpretations because they tell us only that lost life 
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damages would be consistent or inconsistent with a principle of tort law that is 
itself normatively suspect. It is normatively suspect because it seems rooted in the 
concepts of retaliation and revenge. Ultimately, the important analysis for purposes 
of lost life damages is normative, and the current normative defenses of civil 
recourse theory do not support a system that ignores the wrong done to the 
decedent. 
B. Normative Defenses of Civil Recourse 
Civil recourse theorists only recently began to argue that civil recourse is 
normatively attractive. This recent work is particularly important because the most 
apparent underpinning of civil recourse—vengeance—appears unsavory.224 Civil 
recourse theorists have attempted to cleanse vengeance of its bad name in order to 
show how a system built upon principles of redress can be morally plausible.225 
Zipursky, Goldberg, and Solomon have each offered powerful normative defenses 
of civil recourse theory. The most persuasive of these defenses support lost life 
damages.  
1. Fairness 
Zipursky proffers the claim that “one should not have to suffer [an] affront 
passively.”226 It would simply be unfair to force someone to remain passive when 
wronged. Zipursky illustrates the pull of his claim by examining our intuitions 
about familial disputes.227 A young child might feel aggrieved if his sister hits him, 
and his parents might be obligated to “provide the child with some . . . way of 
dealing with having been wronged.”228 Therefore, fairness requires the state to 
provide some opportunity for victims to seek redress.229  
This argument is weaker than it might appear at first. Consider Zipursky’s 
family analogy again. Suppose the parent punished the sister and did so in a way 
that substantially reduced the probability that she would hit her brother in the 
future. In this case the brother would be forced to remain passive in the face of his 
sister’s wrongful behavior. He would have no power to seek redress or choose to 
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forgo it. Yet it is no longer obvious that this would be unfair to the brother. It might 
be unfair for the parents to force the brother to be passive and refuse to punish the 
sister. But this suggests that the moral force behind providing the brother an 
opportunity to seek redress is substantially reduced when his parents adequately 
protect his rights.230 Extending this analogy back to tort law, it might be “unfair” to 
deny a power to seek redress only if the state does not have adequate alternate 
institutions that safeguard individual rights. Of course, no state can hope to 
completely prevent wrongs. This opens up an important role for civil recourse. 
When the criminal law fails to address a wrong for whatever reason, tort law can 
fill in the resulting gap.231 This is a powerful argument in favor of civil recourse, 
but it is no longer about “fairness.” Instead it is a functionalist argument about how 
best to secure individual rights. Although Zipursky eschews functional accounts of 
private law,232 it is these functionalist accounts, not the notion of fairness, that 
provide the strongest normative defense of civil recourse. The next section will 
argue that this and similar functionalist claims support lost life damages.  
2. Respecting Natural Rights and Promoting Equality 
Goldberg’s normative defense of civil recourse theory focuses on the numerous 
salutary effects of a system of civil recourse. On his account these are not the 
“goals” of tort law,233 but they nonetheless serve as a functionalist defense of it: 
Tort law (in the mold of civil recourse) is normatively attractive in part because it 
creates certain salutary effects that “cohere with . . . values and commitments 
embedded in our Constitution”234 and have “an important place within a polity such 
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as ours.”235 Providing a right of redress “affirms agency” by treating people as 
agents who are responsible for their actions,236 and “recognizes, defines, and 
protects the right[s] of persons.”237 Merely offering the power to seek redress 
(regardless of whether it is exercised) “instantiates a notion of equality,”238 “affirms 
[our] status as persons who are entitled not to be mistreated by others,”239 and 
“demonstrates to citizens that the government has a certain level of concern for 
their lives.”240 These arguments rest in part on empirical claims about human 
psychology. But sophisticated regression analyses and controlled studies are not 
required to grasp their plausibility. Nor are such studies required to see how these 
effects are undermined by our current wrongful death practices. 
The above salutary effects are all at least partially undermined by our current 
wrongful death practices and would be enhanced by providing lost life damages.241 
This is easiest to see in cases like Sally’s where the victim is not survived by any 
appropriate beneficiaries under the relevant wrongful death statute. (For ease of 
exposition, I will simply refer to these types of victims as “victims without 
beneficiaries.”) But it is also apparent in the way our practices value fatal wrongs.  
When tort law ignores the wrongs done to victims without beneficiaries, it 
undermines the salutary effects that Goldberg identifies. Tort law affirms agency by 
holding tortfeasors accountable for their actions. Yet tort law currently refuses to 
hold accountable tortfeasors who negligently kill victims without beneficiaries. 
Tort law therefore misses opportunities to affirm the tortfeasor’s agency and 
instead appears to ignore that agency. At the same time tort law misses the 
opportunity to further define and protect rights.242 But the trouble with our 
wrongful death practices goes well beyond missed opportunities. A system that 
immunizes a tortfeasor who, for example, negligently kills someone like Sally 
hardly seems like a system that is well designed to instantiate a notion of equality. 
Instead, our tort system appears biased in favor of those who follow the model of a 
traditional nuclear family by partnering with another adult to raise children. A tort 
system that fails to address victims without beneficiaries also fails to affirm the 
victim’s status as a person entitled not to be mistreated, and certainly does not 
demonstrate to citizens that the government has concern for their lives. In fact, it 
seems to send just the opposite message.  
Even if the victim has beneficiaries who can sue under the relevant wrongful 
death statute, the way damages are calculated weakens the salutary effects that 
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Goldberg proffers. Wrongful death statutes respond to the harms of the 
beneficiaries and ignore the tremendous rights violation that befell the victim 
herself. Although this is a good way to affirm the beneficiaries’ status, it reduces 
the victim’s status to that of a wallet. Tort law currently values the victim as if she 
were solely a means for the flourishing of her family, rather than a person with 
projects of her own. The vast literature on commodification is built on the 
reasonable assumption that our legal practices have the capacity to influence our 
values.243 Of course, it is unlikely that wrongful death damages serve as the 
primary source of our notions of equality, agency, and respect. Many other more 
visible practices influence these ideas. Yet a tort system that is defended on the 
basis of these salutary effects should be structured so as to support them rather than 
undermine them. Providing lost life damages is more consistent with the salutary 
effects that Goldberg identifies than denying such damages. 
3. Mutual Accountability 
Jason Solomon has argued that “acting against” the wrongdoer is morally 
appropriate.244 He begins with the Kantian presumption that we are all owed equal 
respect.245 Tort law derives its normative force from the fact that it recognizes 
people as mutually accountable, in accord with the notion of equal respect.246 The 
concept of mutual accountability highlights the authority of the victim to make a 
demand of the wrongdoer. But the victim is not under any obligation to exercise 
this authority; she is free to forgive the wrongdoer or simply ignore him. Solomon 
argues that the “authority” of the victim under a concept of mutual accountability is 
similar to the “power” of the victim under civil recourse theory.247  
Civil recourse is normatively plausible because it reflects the concept of mutual 
accountability, which in turn reflects a Kantian notion of equal respect. The state 
should support a tort system based on civil recourse because doing so would help 
“achieve or instantiate mutual accountability among equals.”248 This argument 
provides a case for tort law, even in the absence of any need to protect basic rights. 
If the state were to perfectly safeguard our basic rights through the criminal law, we 
would all be answerable to the state, and equal in the eyes of the state. But 
arguably, being accountable more directly to each other, in addition to being 
accountable to the state, is particularly helpful for instantiating equal respect.249 
Such direct symbolism might send a clearer message than criminal law, even if 
both underscore that we owe duties to one another arising from notions of equal 
respect.250 
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Any Kantian defense of civil recourse theory has implications for wrongful 
death practices. Although a superficial interpretation of Kantian ethics would 
preclude lost life damages, Kant’s comments on human psychology provide strong 
support for them. 
A superficial reading of Kant’s ethical theory suggests lost life damages are 
unjustified. People are owed equal respect because they possess a certain threshold 
of rationality and autonomy.251 Our duties to people therefore cease once these 
abilities vanish, as they do upon death. Although the tortfeasor might still have 
duties toward the victim’s surviving relatives, he would not have duties to the 
deceased victim herself.252 In addition to being incomplete, this interpretation of 
Kant has several potentially unappealing consequences. For example, infants and 
some mentally incompetent adults have insufficient rationality and therefore are 
outside of the ambit of equal respect.253 Additionally, harvesting the organs of the 
dead (regardless of their former wishes) would not be a violation of equal 
respect.254 This interpretation is too simple. 
In addition to the duties we owe other rational beings, Kantian ethics support 
moral responsibilities regarding nonrational things like infants, animals, and 
potentially even ecosystems.255 Although we do not owe duties to these things, we 
may owe duties regarding them.256 This moral responsibility stems from the duty 
we owe to ourselves to perfect our nature,257 combined with certain empirical 
assumptions about human psychology.258 Some common human emotions are 
useful in that they help us act in morally appropriate ways and assist us in 
understanding the force of these moral commands.259 We have a duty to ourselves 
to cultivate such emotions. For example, Kant understood that we often have 
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sympathy for nonrational beings.260 This is certainly true regarding infants and 
mentally incompetent adults. But it is also true of animals, as any pet owner will 
attest to. Kant opined that, if this sympathy for nonrational beings were eroded, so 
too might our sympathy for rational beings.261 Thus Kant argued that “violent and 
cruel treatment of animals . . . dulls [our] shared feeling of their pain and so 
weakens and gradually uproots a natural predisposition that is very serviceable to 
morality in one’s relations with other men.”262 But our duties regarding nonrational 
beings extend even further than this. Kant argued that even our treatment of dead 
animals dulled our ability to empathize with one another.263 As such, we would 
owe duties regarding even such thoroughly nonrational things as animal corpses.  
Our treatment of human corpses is particularly likely to impact our ability to 
empathize with other living persons and therefore is a particularly apt area for legal 
regulation. Unsurprisingly, American courts assert strong public policy against 
exhuming bodies.264 Numerous state and federal laws also prohibit desecration of 
burial sites and dead bodies. Consider Lewis Howell, an undertaker in Florida who 
simply staked dead bodies in the woods rather than going through the trouble of 
cremating or burying them.265 He was indicted on 787 felony counts.266 Our respect 
for the preferences of the dead—through testamentary freedom, mortal remains 
statutes, and the UAGA—can be defended on similar Kantian grounds.267  
Based on these types of considerations, a Kantian defense of tort law would 
favor lost life damages. As Part IV.B argued above, these damages foster respect 
for the projects of the living by valuing the former projects of the dead. These 
damages reinforce the idea that people have intrinsic value, and that their projects 
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are worthy of respect. Rejecting lost life damages erodes rather than reinforces 
these ideas. Ignoring the wrongful death of victims without beneficiaries sends a 
fairly potent message about their worth, and appears well-suited to at least partially 
erode notions of equal accountability. Even when the victim has surviving 
beneficiaries, our current wrongful death practices value the victim as a means not 
an end—victims are valued only as a means of their family’s flourishing rather than 
being valued as a being with projects of her own. If wrongful death practices draw 
normative force from Kantian notions of equal respect, then those practices should 
reinforce that respect by providing lost life damages. 
VI. IMPLICATIONS 
A. Lost Life Damages: Desirability  
There are multiple arguments supporting the desirability of lost life damages. 
First, the normative underpinnings of civil recourse suggest that remedies should 
value the victim’s life for its own sake, rather than solely as an instrument to 
provide money and solace to others. Awarding money to her estate, to be 
distributed as she saw fit, is one promising way to vindicate rights and instantiate 
notions of equal respect and mutual accountability. Second, under relational 
accounts of corrective justice, awarding money to the decedent’s estate to further 
her projects is both correlatively structured and serves to mitigate the wrongdoer’s 
termination of the victim’s power to affect the world. Third, such awards comport 
with deterrence rationales, which demand that wrongful death damages include a 
component that represents the losses of the decedent.268  
Alas, there is not a full consensus. Although allocative corrective justice theories 
can theoretically support lost life damages, the case for posthumous benefits is too 
tenuous to provide a solid ground for damages under allocative corrective justice. 
But given that such damages are supported under deterrence theories, relational 
accounts of corrective justice, and the normative defenses of civil recourse, there 
are nonetheless strong reasons to provide lost life damages.  
B. Lost Life Damages: Feasibility 
A full explication of the optimal way to implement a life-projects approach to 
lost life damages is beyond the scope of this Article. Nonetheless, this section 
offers several tentative possibilities. None is perfect, but each goes some way 
toward outlining simple ways that the tort system might implement a life-projects 
approach to lost life damages.  
As mentioned in previous sections, one plausible way to respond to terminating 
the victim’s ability to affect the world is to provide money to her estate. In a will or 
other testamentary instrument, the decedent identifies the projects that she feels are 
important enough to survive her death, and uses her remaining means to further 
those projects. Most people, especially parents, will use their remaining means to 
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further their family’s flourishing. But for those without children, or with already 
grown and thriving children, or simply for those with especially strong 
commitments to their projects, other devises are possible.269 Alfred Nobel, for 
example, sought to set up a foundation to award “prizes to those who, during the 
preceding year, shall have conferred the greatest benefit on mankind.”270  
Providing money to the victim’s estate is an imperfect way of providing her with 
means that she can use to further her ends. Not everyone has a will or other 
testamentary instrument. But in these cases, the state’s default rules for intestate 
succession largely track the intuition that our most important projects concern the 
flourishing of our family and especially our children.271 These rules represent our 
best guess at how the victim herself would have used her remaining means. Even if 
the victim has a detailed will, it still may only be a rough approximation of how 
they would want lost life damages distributed. As wealth grows, people make 
different choices about how to dispose of it. If the victim accurately predicted the 
possibility that a posthumous tort award might increase the value of her estate, then 
her will is likely to accurately reflect her preferences. But it is unclear whether 
victims will anticipate this possibility.272  
There are facially plausible ways to either fully supplant the payment-to-estate 
system or supplement it by implementing lost life damages differently when the 
victim has no will. For example, the court might supply the victim’s family with a 
fixed sum of money that had to be donated to some charity in the victim’s name. 
The victim’s husband, for example, would have some sense of whether the victim 
would want the money to go to her alma mater, or her church, or the local food 
bank.273 In this way, the state can essentially delegate the decision about how the 
victim would want her money spent rather than imposing a single default rule. 
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Although the versions of lost life damages outlined above are preliminary and 
tentative, they offer the promise of responding to the termination of the victim’s 
power to affect the world in a way that goes much further toward undoing the 
wrong than our current wrongful death practices.  
C. Lost Life Damages: Measurability 
Although this Article’s main focus has been on the desirability of lost life 
damages, it will be useful to say a few words about the measurability of such 
damages. There is no obvious formula that can determine how much money to 
provide to the victim’s estate in response to cutting off her ability to affect the 
world. This problem is common to all forms of noneconomic damages.274 Although 
a wide range of valuations are plausible, refusing to value noneconomic harms 
implicitly assigns them zero value. This is perhaps the only valuation that is clearly 
wrong. We routinely grapple with these issues and often settle on some positive 
value. For example, the 9/11 Compensation Commission used a base-value of 
$300,000 for each life lost.275 The U.K. responds to the grief felt by the relatives of 
wrongful death victims by providing them with a fixed £11,800 payment.276 
Several commentators have suggested using the value of a statistical life that 
federal agencies use in cost-benefit analysis—normally $6 million to $9 million—
to help value the harm of death.277 Instead of discussing the appropriateness of 
particular numbers, this Article has sought to motivate future discussions of this 
sort by showing that a life-projects approach to lost life damages is consistent with 
individual justice accounts of tort law. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article has provided the first analysis of wrongful death damages from the 
perspective of individual justice accounts of tort law. These accounts join 
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deterrence-based accounts of tort law to support the desirability of lost life 
damages. Such damages respond to the losses of the decedent herself, rather than to 
the losses of the decedent’s relatives. However, these accounts offer a different 
vision of how tort law should measure such damages. Individual justice accounts 
strongly support a life-projects approach to lost life damages. The simple act of 
awarding lost life damages to the victim’s estate, for example, to then be distributed 
according to her will or other testamentary instrument, is consistent with relational 
corrective justice and the normative accounts of civil recourse theory. If anything, 
the case for lost life damages is overdetermined. Tort remedies should embrace lost 
life damages and thereby mitigate the tragedy of cutting off the victim’s power to 
influence the world. 
